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 ABSTRACT 
Africa has been very slow in effectively implementing regional integration and trade 
agreements and has made little progress to achieve its stated objectives, especially the goal of 
eradicating poverty and promoting development. In addition, the economic integration model 
currently being pursued in Africa suffers from several challenges and has not achieved its goals, 
because of among other things, weak legal and institutional frameworks, and lack of support 
from ordinary African citizens and the private sector.  In light of the above, this research 
investigate the appropriateness of this model. 
This research begins with the theoretical discussions of integration and identifies the existing 
gaps within the African regional integration process. This reveals that there are not only 
foundational and definitional disparities within the African regional integration process but 
also that Africa lacks the necessary prerequisite for any successful regional integration. In 
particular, this research reveals that the institutions that are mandated to accelerate regional 
integration process lack the necessary capacity to achieve regional integration process.  
The discussions of  theories behind regional economic integration reveals that the 
understanding of regional integration in Africa are rooted in the economic understanding of 
regionalism with insufficient attention given to the importance of strong institutional and legal 
frameworks and a human centred development. Importantly, these discussions reveal that the 
European integration economic model that was a success in European Community has been 
adopted in Africa without reviewing its appropriateness for the continent. 
The debates of the history of African regional integration in Africa demonstrate that regional 
integration process is not a new phenomenon in Africa and that African leaders have always 
embraced integration and have perceived it as a way of addressing Africa’s social and 
economic challenges. Importantly, the discussions of the history demonstrate the role African 
leaders played in fighting colonialism and dismantling the apartheid system in South Africa. 
Unfortunately, these discussions also show that after independence Africa was a continent 
faced with many challenges. In particular, history shows that after independence African 
leaders gave little support to Pan Africanism which had been driving force behind 
decolonisation and became oppressive and in many instances, committed human rights 
violations against their own people. This state of affairs has led to economic development being 
sacrificed. 
vii 
The discussions of the benefits of economic integration shows that while there are benefits 
linked to economic integration such as the reduction of poverty and development in countries 
such as China, India and Thailand, for Africa is unable to deal with the challenge of poverty 
and underdevelopment .  African countries continue to witness increasing levels of poverty and 
poor development while few businesses and political elites remain the main beneficiaries of 
the economic integration model. 
The analyses of the institutional and legal structures reveal that the institutions mandated with 
regional integration and the laws governing regional integration process are either weak or non-
existence. This is demonstrated by the slow implementation of regional projects. Even though 
Africa has made significant steps to facilitate its regional integration, it has been unable to deal 
with the challenges confronting the continent, especially the rising levels of poverty and 
underdevelopment. While this this research supports and  approves the steps that have been 
adopted to facilitate regional integration and trade,  nevertheless this research observes that 
institutions that are mandated to drive regional integration have been unable to promote African 
regional integration.  Africa lacks the necessary infrastructure and human capacity to achieve 
regional integration.  
The research question therefore is whether the economic integration model currently being 
pursued in Africa under its existing framework is the appropriate model for African regional 
integration since it is not supported by a proper legal system and the African people and does 
not directly address the issues that confront ordinary African citizens? 
While the author observes that Africa has considerably improved its trade and strengthened its 
integration process, the author nevertheless concludes that the economic integration model 
currently being pursued in Africa is unlikely to succeed, because it does not take into account 
African realities and lacks the necessary prerequisites for successful economic integration, 
viii 
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CHAPTER 1: THE CONCEPT OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA 
1.1                                             INTRODUCTION 
Africa has been very slow in effectively implementing regional integration and trade 
agreements and has made slight progress to achieve its stated objectives, especially 
the goal of eradicating poverty and promoting development. While Africa contains six 
of the fastest growing economies in the world, it has been unable to transform such 
growth to deal with the unprecedented level of poverty that seeks to undermine human 
existence. For instance, the latest report by social justice organisation, Oxfam, paints 
a bleak picture of Africa in its fight to eradicate poverty and deal effectively with the 
challenge of inequality that continue to torment continent. The report pinpoints 
challenges facing Africa’s poor and observes that the economic growth that has been 
experienced in Africa over the last 20 years has only benefited the rich, at the exclusion 
of the poor. The report proposes to African leaders to develop new economic models 
that are pro-poor.1  
In view of the above conditions and the fact that African integration is characterised 
by weak legal systems and institutions mandated to drive regional integration lack the 
necessary capacity to carry out regional integration,2 the author doubts the 
appropriateness of economic models of integration that have been adopted in Africa. 
The research question therefore is whether the economic integration model currently 
being pursued in Africa under its existing framework is the appropriate model for 
African regional integration since it is not supported by a proper legal system and the 
African people and does not directly address the issues that confront ordinary African 
citizens? 
The main purpose of this study is to examine the appropriateness of the economic 
integration model for African regional integration since this model is perceived as the 
only way in which Africa can address its complex challenges. The study further 
identifies the main causes for Africa’s slow progress in fully implementing African 
regional integration policies and factors behind its poor performance in regional 
                                                          
1  “ Starting with People”: “A Human Economy Approach to Inclusive Growth in Africa” Oxfam Briefing Paper – 
Executive Summary 2 MAY 2017 www.oxfam.org at 1-8. 
2 Trudi Hartzenberg, "Regional integration in Africa." Available at SSRN 1941742 (2011) at 18. 
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integration, especially the failure to eradicate poverty and promote development. This 
research further investigates the reasons why African leaders are reluctant to 
implement the same agreements which they have endorsed. Finally, this dissertation 
offers recommendations on how the continent can improve its integration prospects.  
It is the argument of this dissertation that for Africa to successfully realise its aspiration 
for deeper regional integration, it is important that it develops its own model of 
integration that not only embraces law as an essential component for a successful 
regional integration but a model that reflects African realities and the unique nature of 
Africa. Africa must develop a new economic model that is beneficial not only to the few 
business and multinational corporations and political elites but which makes provision 
for the poor since poverty is still the biggest challenge facing Africa. The economic 
integration model currently being pursued in Africa is unlikely to succeed, because it 
does not take into account African realities and lacks the necessary prerequisites for 
successful economic integration.  
While numerous studies have examined the challenges and prospects of African 
regional integration, they have rarely provided an all-inclusive approach that views 
African integration beyond the narrow economic understanding of regionalism. 
Therefore, this research offers a comprehensive approach that places prominence on 
an integration model driven by strong legal and institutional frameworks and a model 
that is human-centred. 
Of course, the challenges facing African regional integration are not only legal. In fact, 
several challenges facing Africa integration are structural and economic. For instance, 
political instabilities, poor infrastructure, and trade related problems and behind the 
border challenges are main impediments to African regional integration.3   
1.2                                       Concept of Regional Integration 
According to Biswaro the concept of ‘integration’ is one of the most difficult concepts 
to understand as many scholars have grappled to find one definitive meaning to the 
concept.  Biswaro quoting ‘Puchala’ who summed up this problem of definition as 
                                                          
3 Amal Nagah Elbeshbishi “Trade Facilitation in Africa: Challenges, Opportunities and Progress” Organization of 
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) High Level Forum on Trade Facilitation and Single Window for Enhanced Regional 
Economic Cooperation, Casablanca- Morocco, 25- 26 February 2013 at 10. 
3 
 
follows: “He compared this difficulty of definition of integration to a blind man 
confronted with the task of defining an elephant.”4  
Biswaro notes that lack of a clear and acceptable definition poses important questions. 
For instance, ‘is integration an economic or a political phenomenon?’ ‘What does it 
mean to be fully integrated?’5  According to this author, to fully understand the regional 
integration debate it is important that one familiarises oneself with the concepts and 
theories behind integration. He submits that economists prefer to use the term 
‘economic integration’ while lawyers prefer the term ‘regional integration’.  According 
to him, ‘these distinctions no longer have any significance on the term itself as the 
term covers all elements of integration.’6 Accordingly, regional integration is much 
broader and includes politics, economics, law and policies, regional security, human 
rights, education, health, technology and other elements. 
1.3                                       Definition of Regional Integration 
Biswaro describes regional integration as a:   
‘… Process and an end state in which intergovernmental organisations, between three or more 
countries, which involves them pooling their resources with a view to cover larger and a more 
open economic integration that is beneficial to Member States.’ 7 
Haarlov submits that regional integration is a: 
“… Process by which a group of nation states voluntarily and in various degrees have access 
to each other’s markets and establish mechanisms and techniques that minimise conflicts and 
maximise internal and external economic, political, social and cultural benefits of their 
interaction.”8  
The above definitions reflect the economic understanding of regionalism which places 
importance on economics, markets, and trade liberalisation with the assumption that 
it will ultimately result in the formation of a political union. This narrow conception may 
                                                          
4 Joram Mukama Biswaro “The Quest for Regional Integration in Africa, Latin America and Beyond in the Twenty 
first century: Experience, Progress And Prospects”  A Comparative Study 2011 page 20 Fundacao Alexandre de 
Gusmao Foundation at 57 and 58.  
5 Ibid at 68. 
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid at 17. 
8 Margaret Lee "Regionalism in Africa: A part of problem or a part of solution." Polis/RCSP/CPSR 9 (2002) at 4. 
4 
 
have been successful in other parts of the world but certainly it has failed in Africa and 
therefore it is important that its appropriateness be reviewed.   
1.4                                        Rationale Behind African Integration 
Africa is the only region in the world in which almost every country belongs to more 
than two regional economic communities. For instance, Saurombe citing Mattli notes 
that 95 percent of African countries belong to at least more than one regional economic 
community (REC).9  In Africa it is believed that economic integration and free trade 
can help Africa reduce poverty and promote development. For example,  this notion is 
often supported and motivated by the success of the European Union integration 
project which managed to reduce barriers to trade significantly. Most recently, the 
speedy economic growth of Asian countries such as China, India, and Thailand has 
further strengthened this view.10 However, Salami submits that the European 
Community (EC) regional integration agenda was successful because it was 
supported by a stronger legal system with an enforcement mechanism in the form of 
the European Court of Justice.11  
Dirar submits, in relation to SADC, that solidarity, human rights, democracy and rule 
of law are some of the main principles governing the organisation.12 However, there is 
no mechanism and no guidance on how to interpret these principles.13  For Dirar, the 
decision to dissolve the tribunal and the refusal to sanction SADC tribunal decisions 
is an indication that SADC members consider the principle of solidarity more important 
than other principles of the organisation.14 Dirar submits that SADC leaders interpret 
solidarity to mean uniting and supporting each other’s actions even if it is a 
transgression of their governing principles.15    
1.5                                            History of African Integration 
                                                          
9 Amos Saurombe: “An analysis of economic integration in Africa with specific reference to the Africa Union and 
the African Economic Community” in Southern African Public Law Vol 27 issue 1 at 302. 
10Biswaro op cit  at 20. 
11 Iwa Salami: “Legal and Institutional challenges of Economic integration in Africa “European Law Journal Vol 17 
No 5, at 669.  
12 Luwam G Dirar: “Rethinking and Theorizing Integration in Southern Africa,’ Emory International Law Review, 
28 Emory Inte’I L. Rev 123 at 3. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
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According to Shaw, the regional integration agenda is not a new phenomenon in Africa 
since African regional integration agenda dates back as early as the 20th century.16 
He notes that the doctrine of Pan Africanism influenced African regional integration. 
According to Shaw this doctrine recognised the importance of unity in economic, 
social, and political progress and was aimed at uniting and improving the living 
standards of people of African descent.17 He submits that this ideology later became 
important in the fight against colonialism in Africa and therefore laid the foundation for 
the Pan Africanism Movement and paved the way for the establishment of the 
Organisation of African Unity.18 
Since then, there has been a growing number of African regional economic 
communities (REC) being formed across the African continent, each with the intention 
to drive economic development. Africa is the only region in which one country belongs 
to more than two sub-regional communities. For instance, since 2010, out of 53 
countries, 27 belonged to more than two regional economic communities and 18 
belonged to three with the Democratic Republic of Congo belonging to four.19   
1.6                                    Nature of African Regional Integration 
Kiplagat observes that economic analysis dominates regional integration discourses  
with insufficient attention given to institutional structures. 20  He argues that since 
economic integration is viewed as the solution to developing countries' economic 
challenges, the success or failure of integration attempts has depended upon and 
been measured by economic results.21 Consequently, the long-established classical 
example of the failure of regional integration in developing countries has tended to be 
an economic one.22  
                                                          
16 Shaw, A. (2009). "The OAU, institutional leadership and the quest for African co-operation: from hope to 
despair." AFFRIKA Journal of Politics, Economics and Society: Leadership and Governance in Africa 1(1) at 45. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Rodrigo Tavares and Vanessa Tang 2011: “Regional economic integration in Africa: impediment to progress?” 
South Africa Journal of International Affairs, 18:2, 217-233, DOI:.1080/10220461. 102011.588826 link 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2011.588826  at 224. 
20 P. Kenneth Kiplagat An Institutional and Structural Model for Successful Economic Integration in Developing 
Countries Texas International Law Journal Winter, 1994 29 Tex. Int'l L.J. 39 at 5. 
21Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
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Kiplagat submits that this is demonstrated by most analyses on regional integration 
that reflect the analytical modes of economists and political discipline.23 Kiplagat 
argues that the economic approach has prevented the development of other models 
and this is demonstrated by the lack of study of institutional and legal arrangements.24  
Indeed, regional integration in developing countries, especially in Africa is largely 
influenced by the economic model that fails to consider the nature of Africa, its history 
and level of development. This model continues to be the main motive for African 
regional integration even though its prospects of success remain doubtful. For 
instance, the Africa Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have adopted and 
embraced the economic model of integration without evaluating its feasibility and 
prospects of success.25 The author supports Kiplagat’s view that the dominance of 
economists and political scientists in regional integration debates have led to the 
understatement of the importance of having strong institutional and legal 
arrangements.  
According to Gibb, despite the movement towards regionalism here in Africa and 
throughout the world, Africa has been neglected in the theoretical discussion on 
regionalism.26 Gibb submits that the understanding of regional integration in Africa is 
based on a Eurocentric conception of regionalism which fails to consider the nature, 
character, and culture of the African continent. Gibb concludes that this may explain 
why Africa has performed poorly in its regional integration aspirations.27  
Again, the understanding of regional integration through the lenses of European 
integration processes fails to appreciate that in Africa, regional integration is broader 
than the economist understanding of regionalism and include cooperation in social, 
political, cultural and socio-economic issues such as education.  
Draper argues that African economic integration modelled on the European 
understanding of regionalism is not suited to regional capacities and may be 
                                                          
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid.  
25 The African RECs follow the gradual process laid down by AEC Treaty that seeks to achieve integration 
through 34-year period in six defined stages. 
26 Richard Gibb (2009) : “Regional integration and Africa’s Development Trajectory: meta -theories, expectations 
and reality,” Third World Quarterly, 30:4, 701-721 Link http://dx.doi.org/1080/01436590902867136 accessed 
on 26 April 2016, at: 03:02 see at 702. 
27 Ibid. 
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detrimental to its aspirations.28 He argues that this gap may be aggravated by the 
technical and theoretical analyses that are done through the lenses of economics or 
international relations.29 He submits that even though there is huge support for 
economic integration in Africa through the establishment of initiatives aimed at 
achieving economic integration, ‘often the rhetoric does not match the reality.’30  
Draper submits that Africa’s economic integration ‘suffers from a litany of problems, 
overlapping membership, unfulfilled commitments, unrealistic expectations and 
concludes that it is important that Africa reconsider its understanding of regionalism 
which stems from European foundations.’31 However, he argues that this does not 
mean that Africa cannot learn one or two things from other models being used in other 
regions.  
Certainly, the argument here does not advocate for total abolition of the economic 
model of integration as found in Europe or other parts of the world, but calls for review 
of its appropriateness for Africa’s integration in view of the continental realities. This 
view is supported by this research. 
Asante questions the economic integration model and its appropriateness for Africa, 
considering that the continent lacks the prerequisites and characteristics that are 
essential for economic integration to materialise and submits that market- led 
approach is appropriate for the developed regions and was a success in the European 
Union because of their advanced industries.32  
Considering that economic integration has failed to increase intra-African trade and 
integrate African trade with the rest of the world, Hartzenberg questions the economic 
model of integration in Africa, particularly its suitably to address the real problems that 
retard Africa’s regional and international trade performance.33  
                                                          
28 Peter Draper: “Rethinking the (European) Foundations of sub-Saharan African Regional Economic Integration: 
A Political Economy Essay “September 2010 OECD Development Centre Working Paper No 293 Link at 6 
http://www.oecd.org/dev/wp . 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid at  7. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Asante, S. K:  “Regionalism and Africa’s Development: expectations, realities and challenges” New York: St 
Martin Press, 1997 at 63. 
33 Cited in Hartzenberg at 12. 
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Dirar submits that legal scholars when confronted with the study or question of 
integration, their investigation reflects the analytical models that are concerned with 
the implementation and the enforcement of policies or treaties.  Dirar observes that for 
lawyers, law is neutral and they believe that the socio-economic and political 
circumstances of member states do not affect the legality or binding nature of a treaty 
agreement.34 
Dirar’s argument here is disputed since it fails to acknowledge that laws generally are 
developed in view of the prevailing social and political environment. For instance, the 
widely accepted principles of ‘variable geometry’ and ‘asymmetry’ in Africa were 
designed in view of the fact that African countries are at different stages of 
development and therefore have different capabilities.35 These principles recognise 
that some countries may fall behind in implementing regional agreements because of 
their existing socio-economic and political challenges, hence it gives poor members of 
the community more time to implement agreed trade and other commitments, and to 
advance integration at different paces and at different stages.36 
Nevertheless, Dirar further submits that to legal scholars, the realisation of integration 
depends on the legal design of the integration project and member states’ compliance 
with it.  Dirar observes that legal scholars are merely focused on understanding the 
status of community law at the domestic level of member states and its consistence 
with the laws of community and other international obligations.37 Dirar concludes that 
this narrow approach of understanding integration in Africa is problematic because 
from Africa’s viewpoint, integration is broader than law and therefore it may be 
important to rethink the idea of law as a ‘freestanding enterprise in integration.’38   
However, Oppong submits that even if socio-economic and political challenges are 
successfully addressed, African economic integration agenda depends on how 
committed African leaders and member states take seriously their legal issues.39  He 
                                                          
34 Cited in Dirar  at 9. 
35 Henry Kibet Mutai Regional trade integration strategies under SADC and the EAC: A comparative analysis, 
SADC Law Journal, Volume 1, 2011 at 83. 
36 Ibid.  
37 Cited in Dirar at 2. 
38 Ibid.  
39 Olabisi D. Akinkugbe Book Review Journal of International Economic Law, 2015, Legal Aspects of Economic 
Integration in Africa. By RICHARD FRIMPONG OPPONG, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011 at 936. 
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submits that “... there is so much in the realm of law which, if unaddressed, will still 
hinder the success and effectiveness of economic integration in Africa.”40   
For Oppong, one of the reasons why Africa’s economic integration has been 
unsuccessful is the fact that “no legal framework currently exists in Africa to manage 
relations between the community and Member States legal systems on the one hand, 
and among the various communities and Member States legal systems on the other.”41  
The author supports the broader interpretation of Africa regional integration to include 
cooperation in many areas such as trade, management of borders, fighting terrorism, 
sharing information and technology. However, as observed by Oppong, law as part of 
the broader structure of integration, plays an important role in governing the relations 
between the different structures and in ensuring a ruled based system. Without such 
system to govern the relations between these different structures, it becomes difficult 
to uphold the rule based system. A system that is regulated by loose cooperation is 
vulnerable and open to abuse as members are not legally obliged to apply and 
implement regional agreements. 
Hartzenberg submits that African regional integration agenda is characterised by poor 
implementation, missed deadlines, delays in the ratification and domestic 
incorporation of regional legal instruments and lack of enforcement mechanisms.42 
Hartzenberg concludes that regional integration programmes and the regional 
institutions established to contribute to the implementation of these agreements, ‘do 
not play a robust role an as external anchor or agency to ensure national compliance 
and domestic policy, legal and institutional development as may be required by the 
regional integration agreements.’43   
Oppong submits that ‘true integration does not occur without a strong legal framework 
and an attendant legal system.’44 Oppong notes that one of the striking features of 
African economic integration is the inactivity or non-existence of regional courts 
established under various regional economic integration treaties. He submits that they 
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do not have settled cases or in most instances tackle issues not directly associated 
with economic integration processes.45  
In contrast, while Gathii acknowledges that the African Regional Trade Agreements 
(RTA) judicial bodies have decided insufficient number of dispute settlement cases 
related to trade, noting that in Africa there has been an increasing use of these judicial 
bodies without much acknowledgement in the academic literature.46  
For Kiplagat, the gradual approach adopted by developing countries cannot resist the 
political pressures of disintegration and is thus impracticable.  Although the gradual 
approach has dominated regional integration study, developing countries can only 
achieve economic integration when they attempt progressive forms of integration.47  
It must be pointed out that Kiplagat’s view does not consider the demands that 
economic integration imposes on poor countries and the difficulty that they may 
encounter in pursuing regional integration.  For example, Wolff observed that the 
structural adjustment by the Bretton Woods institutions and particularly the loan 
conditionality by the World Bank on poor countries places enormous difficulties on 
these countries’ already limited administrative resources to achieve economic 
integration.48 For instance, when Bangladesh  received credit from the World Bank in 
2005, of the 53 conditions added to the loan, 18 required that Bangladesh privatise its 
banks, electricity, and telecommunications sectors despite the fact that half of its 
population lives below poverty line.49  Furthermore, even though these conditions 
proved to be impractical and failed to address the challenge of poverty facing poor 
countries, the average amount of conditions imposed on poor countries increased 
remarkably between 2002 and 2005.50  
Therefore, while it is important to fast-track African regional integration and integrate 
Africa with the rest of the world, one must acknowledge the difficulties that advanced 
                                                          
45 Ibid.  
46 James T. Gathii The Under-Appreciated Jurisprudence of African Regional Trade Judiciaries, 12 Or. Rev. Int'l L. 
245 (2010) at 1. 
47 Cited in Kiplagat at 8. 
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Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 71 at 10. 
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forms of integration have on the economy of poor countries, particularly the demand it 
places on administrative resources, the infrastructure and generally, its impact on 
socio-economic issues of these countries.  
According to Kiplagat, the gradual approach decelerates implementation of regional 
agreements and equally theorises long-lasting investment and economic decisions, 
hence increasing risks and discouraging investment. Because the weak legal status 
of cooperation arrangements cannot assure foreign investors' doubts about the 
permanence of regional integration in developing countries, heavy regional investment 
will not occur in a systematic process.51   
It is submitted that while the view that gradual approach does slow down 
implementation of regional agreements and projects may be correct, the step by step 
approach in the African context allows poorer countries more time to implement those 
agreed projects. Therefore, although such approach may slow down integration , in 
Africa it remains a motivating factor because even poor members of the community 
are valued and considered important members.  
1.7                                        Status of African integration 
Presently, politicians and African leaders are the main drivers of regional integration 
and all of them have embraced African integration. For instance, Olowu notes that the 
transformation of the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) 
received massive support from all 53 African countries except for one. Olowu notes 
that this was a much-celebrated event but only among political elites.52 
1.8                                        Models of Regional Integration: 
1.8.1                                            Economic integration 
Biswaro notes that the earliest theoretical work on regional integration was found on 
Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage in international trade and in the interest of 
economists in promoting the reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade.53 
According to this theory trade is beneficial as it allows each country to specialise in 
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those products in which it has a comparative advantage and import those goods for 
which they have a comparative disadvantage.  
Lee submits that economic integration involves in linear sequence the creation of 
stage process of economic integration beginning with the formation of Preferential 
Trade Agreement (PTA) to formation of Economic Community.54  Accordingly, this 
process includes the formation of a Free Trade Area (FTA) where tariffs are removed 
among Member States, and is followed by a Customs Union (CU) where the FTA 
remains in place and Member States impose a common external tariff against 
members who are not constituent to the FTA.55 The formation of common market 
follows where the customs union remains in place along with the free flow of the factors 
of production.56 Further, an economic union is introduced which consists of a common 
market along with the harmonisation of monetary and fiscal policies.  Finally, the 
formation of total economic integration, which consists of a common market along with 
the unification of monetary and fiscal policies.  
However, the theory of comparative advantage has been criticised and it has been 
argued that free trade argument lacks legitimacy in a globally integrated world because 
it does not assume capital mobility. For instance, Daly submits that: 
“… free capital mobility totally undercuts Ricardo’s comparative theory argument for 
free trade goods because that argument is premised on capital (and other factors) 
being immobile across nations. Under the new globalised world, capital tends to flow, 
moving to wherever returns are high as compared to risks, in that way pursuing 
absolute advantage.”57   
In addition, Ha-Joon Chang submits that: 
“The principle has been used by developed industrialised countries to ensure that 
underdeveloped nations continue to specialise in agricultural production, instead of 
developing their own manufacturing industries which would make them competitive 
with industrialised countries” The industrialised nations prefer free ‘trade’ between 
                                                          
54 Lee op cit at 4. 
55 Ibid.  
56 Ibid. 
57 Cited in Biswaro at 59. 
13 
 
countries, to maintain the underdeveloped world’s pattern of dependency on 
developed countries.”58 
One of the biggest criticisms of this theory is that the conditions under article XXIV do 
not consider the effect of  the establishment of a customs union or free trade area on 
the distribution of world resources.59 In addition, because Africa’s developing countries 
lack the necessary prerequisites for trade creation, regional integration is likely to have 
immaterial impact on the trade system and its design  in Africa.60 Regional integration 
has failed in Africa because intra-African trade between African countries occurs at a 
lower scale and therefore under the current conditions the theory is impractical and 
harmful for African integration process.61  
Viner observed that “regional economic integration would lead to either trade creation 
or trade diversion.”62 He argued that by reducing barriers to trade, customs unions and 
free trade areas could result in expensive domestic products in a member state being 
substituted by a much more efficient producer at lower-cost imports from another 
member country. However, he also contended that such could result in lower cost 
imports being substituted by higher priced imports by an inefficient producer of a 
member of such customs union and leading to trade ‘diversion’, if the most efficient 
producer of that product is not a member of customs union63. While economic 
integration can help reduce poverty and has been credited for much reduction of 
poverty in the world in countries such as China, India, and Brazil, it can also have 
devastating effects on the national economy of a country which could result in job 
losses and huge income losses.64  
Furthermore, this theory fails to consider the lack of efficient administrative systems 
and infrastructural facilities as important elements of a successful economic 
integration, particularly the cost involved in pursuing market-led integration. For 
instance, Biswaro submits that with the world advancing in technology and with 
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barriers being lowered, it has been difficult for governments to monitor and to control 
border problems such as terrorism, human trafficking, money laundering and other 
challenges.65  
This theory totally ignores the fact that tariffs are not the only barriers to trade. For 
instance, Elbeshbishi submits that even though tariffs have been substantially reduced 
across the world, complying with customs formalities has been a challenge. This 
Author observes that customs procedure and administration in Africa is characterised 
by excessive documentary requirements, outdated procedures, lack of automation 
and insignificant use of information technology, lack of transparency, predictability, 
and consistency, as well as lack of cooperation with other government agencies.66 
Delays at the customs are very common in the region. This approach is clearly 
unsuitable and out of touch with African realities.67 
1.8.2                                               Political integration 
Saurombe submits that this model requires members to cooperate with one another 
and to have similar issues and challenges which lead to a sharing of resources and 
interests.68 For Biswaro, regional cooperation does not necessarily require members 
to cede some of their sovereignty to the central institutions. It is aimed at ensuring that 
there is a peaceful co-existence, friendship and solidarity and respect for national 
borders and national sovereignty.69 Saurombe  submits that political integration 
implies that state-led projects of cooperation that emerge are the result of diplomatic 
interacting.70 He submits further that in the international arena, the members can 
galvanise each other and form one interest group in the form of a coalition to take a 
joint stand against the rest of the world.71 Regional cooperation may help describe 
steps along the way to regional integration.72  
This theory informed the establishment of the OAU and its governing principles of 
sovereignty and non-interference and respect for national borders. In general, most 
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African states had just gained independence and greater number of African 
governments were very protective of their sovereignty. Therefore, OAU was formed 
as a loose cooperation aimed at decolonising the African continent. Saurombe submits 
that regional cooperation needs to be supported by a proper legal system.73   
1.8.3                                            Development integration 
This theory is defined as a ‘combination of market integration, with its focus on the 
removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, and the production integration which 
focuses on cooperation in the planning and implementing of productive activities.’74 
This model was developed as an alternative approach to the limitations of economic 
integration. According to this theory, the objectives of regional co-operation and 
integration for poor countries are not to be found in “marginal change and economic 
efficiency”75  but in the transfer of economic resources and increased production 
volume, increased investment, and trade. Accordingly, the market does not dictate 
scope of co-operation or the sector.76  Saurombe submits that in order to achieve the 
specified goals, this theory acknowledges the importance of creating supranational 
institutions.77  
Lee observes that development integration requires more state intervention than 
market integration.78 Accordingly states must not seem to promote integration but must 
make a political commitment to integration, since such commitment is the basis for 
cooperation.79 Lee submits that it is anticipated that this will help member states work 
towards implementing policies that will help with problems created as a result of 
unequal benefits.80  With a view to providing a remedy for the unequal distribution of 
benefits, policies that are of a compensatory and corrective nature are to be 
implemented. For instance, Southern African Customs Union (SACU) is engaged in 
both non-financial and financial redistribution.81 Non-financial redistributive 
programmes include the allocation of important industries to disadvantaged member 
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countries in order to counter the tendency of investors to move towards those already 
well established industrial countries such as South Africa.82  
According to Gathii, these measures aimed at equalising benefits and allocation of 
industries, undermine the purpose of integration under a market based model of free 
competition among the most efficient producers.83 A study of East African Community 
and SACU reveal that compensatory mechanisms are sometimes ineffective and 
countries being compensated still fail to attract investment.84 These challenges can be 
attributed to the problem of implementation. Although designed to correct the problems 
of market integration, development integration has proven more difficult to implement 
than market integration.85   
1.8.4                                                 Neo Functionalism 
Haas developed what is now known as ‘neo-functionalism’ and believed that modern 
democratic states need sound management of the economy and centralised 
institutions. Haas theory was concerned with civil society and political organisations 
promoting their economic interests.86 He believed that the decision to integrate 
economically would create economic and political spill overs unintended or unwanted 
consequences of earlier decisions which are the major force driving regional 
integration further forward.87 Steps towards integration at any given time tend to 
generate unexpected pressures for further integration which he referred as ‘spill 
overs.’ This theory argues that decisions in favour of integration cannot be explained 
as responses to external shocks and trends as such but instead grow or originate 
within prior integration.88  
According to Biswaro, the theory encourages cooperation and aims to convince 
national leaders to cede some of their sovereignty to the benefit of regional 
integration.89  Furthermore, it presumes that there is a strong civil society and that 
although civil society organisations may have a different agenda, they recognise 
                                                          
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Mutai op cit note 57 at 36-37 
85 Saurombe op cit note 66 at 42. 
86 Cited in Biswaro at  76. 
87 Andrew Moravcsik “The European Constitutional Compromise and the neofunctionalist legacy” Journal of 
European Public Policy 12:2 April 2005: 349–386 at 352. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Cited in Biswaro  at 76. 
17 
 
cooperation as the only way which could accelerate regional integration.90 In other 
words, this theory assumes that the economy is driven by technicians, planners, 
industrialists, and trade union movements and not politicians. Proponents of this 
theory are of the view that people working for the supranational institutions will develop 
loyalty to the regional organisation. This theory has lost its relevance and Haas himself 
acknowledged that neo-functionalism assumptions were wrong and that there are not 
only spill overs but also spillbacks.91 
Furthermore, even though there are those who are enthusiastic about deeper 
integration, there are also those who are opposed to such integration. For instance, 
Biswaro observes that in Africa there are age-old diverging views between the 
extremists and the moderates about the formation of an African government.92 He 
submits that the issue which has been hindering the process is the principle of non-
interference.93 He further submits that the neo- functionalist assumes that economic 
and other social issues are far more important than long established concerns such 
as national security and interstate rivalry.94 Moreover, neo-functionalism ignores state 
power and the important role it plays in decision making and fails to acknowledge that 
decisions are taken by politicians.95   
For Welz, lack of resources and financial support to engage deeper into regional 
agreements may discourage members, especially countries suffering from post- 
conflict trauma. For such countries, domestic policies aimed at recovery are far more 
important than regional integration policies.96 
As demonstrated, these models of integration are western led models that are suitable 
for European integration hence they have failed to address the unique challenges that 
confront Africa, especially the challenge of poverty and inequality across the continent. 
Therefore, their appropriateness should be reviewed and a contextualised model of 
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African integration be developed with a view to promoting the development and 
wellbeing of ordinary African citizens.  
1.9                               Benefits of Regional Integration 
Economic integration has been credited for much of the reduction in world poverty and 
it is believed that free trade can help reduce poverty. According to Biswaro there is 
evidence that countries that have embraced free trade have successfully managed to 
reduce their poverty levels.97 The speedy economic growth of Asian countries has 
significantly reduced poverty in countries such as China, India, and Thailand.98   
Udombana submits that in Africa, economic integration is viewed as a means to 
promote the economic and social development of the continent.99 Furthermore, it 
provides an opportunity for Africa to participate in the world economy.100 Integration 
also promotes development on a ‘complementary and sustained basis’101 of the 
member countries. This is done through the strengthening of existing infrastructure, 
the development of an efficient payment mechanism, greater access to credit, greater 
awareness of each other’s products etc.102 
Likewise, Mutai observe that the motives for pursuing regional integration is the desire 
to achieve economies of scale connected to a larger market size. However, he submits 
that this could be achieved through a multilateral trading system and an open domestic 
economy.103 According to Mutai, for developing countries, regional integration 
provides an opportunity for these countries to overcome their small economic size as 
it allows them to pool their limited economic resources together.104 Regional 
integration can fast track in facilitating members to multilateralism, it can provide a 
more efficient way of negotiating agreements and can enable the majority in the 
community to put pressure on non-cooperative members to comply with trade rules.105  
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In addition, free trade results in goods and services being sold to the public at cheaper 
prices and attributes this to the fact that there are no tariffs added to the products.106 
Countries belonging to RECs have access to large markets, such as EU and USA. In 
addition, they also enjoy preferences such as the Generalised System of Preferences 
or the United States of America’s African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).107 In 
the Southern African region alone, AGOA has been the major factor in poverty 
reduction when one considers the benefits members to this agreement enjoy.108  
Cited in Mwasha Park and Park argue that economic integration can also serve as a 
motivation for investment and the attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI). General 
improvements such as stabilisation, market liberalisation, and privatisation adopted 
under regional arrangements can increase revenues to all factors and at best, can 
increase private investment.109  
Saurombe also notes that regional agreements can help address specific logistical 
issues such as “border controls, transit, migration and movement of labour.”110 He 
submits that countries understand that  these barriers can equally distort trade same 
as with tariffs and therefore, regional agreements deal with these issues which are  
best addressed at regional level.111 Regional economic integration can serve a useful 
economic purpose beyond the direct gains from trade liberalisation, by reducing 
uncertainties and improving credibility and thus making it easier for the private sector 
to plan and invest.112  
Muthai observes that integration and economic interdependence promote political 
cooperation in various ways. It provides a more efficient and friendly method to acquire 
benefits and resources.113 According to Biswaro, integration helps to strengthen good 
governance and he submits that poor governance has been the major factor in the 
dismal economic growth of many countries in the world. He submits that integration 
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places emphasis on good governance because the rapidly competitive global 
marketplace does not accommodate corruption, which adds to business costs.114  
However, those who are opposed to integration often argue that it is used to exploit 
poor people in the developing world. Biswaro notes that the critics contend that 
because the poor do not have the means of production, it only benefits those who 
have resources and the poor are side-lined115. They conclude that integration is the 
main reason for the income inequalities in the world.116  
Wolff observes that strict loan conditions by the World Bank are generally aimed at 
cutting budget on socio-economic issues and rather, redirecting the funds towards 
market liberalisation to cover the lost revenues that is a direct result of lowering export 
barriers.117 The consequences of these conditions are lower salaries, impoverishment 
for Africans, and cheaper raw materials for multinational companies.118  
According to Mwasha, disproportionate distribution of benefits among members leads 
to the exploitation of economically weaker countries and thus these smaller countries 
are left behind which results in these countries withdrawing from the economic trade 
union.119  
Biswaro argues that “integration only provides job security to the portion of society 
which has the skills and mobility to utilise the opportunities afforded by global markets, 
whereas at the same time unskilled workers are left out due to labour intensive imports 
from minimum wage countries or imports manipulated overseas by multinational 
corporations to reduce costs.”120  
1.10                                             Conclusion 
The theoretical discussions of African regional integration are embedded in the 
economic understanding of regionalism without giving much attention to the unique 
nature of Africa. The economic model of integration understates the importance of 
strong institutional and legal frameworks and a human centred development. 
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Therefore, the endorsement of economic integration policies without questioning their 
appropriateness for Africa is baffling. Even though this model has proven to be 
detrimental to the African continent and its people, this model is still viewed as the 
suitable approach for African regional integration.  
The failure of most regional arrangements that follow the economic model 
necessitates that an investigation be conducted on the appropriateness of this model 
and a new approach be developed. Such a model should reflect African realities and 
be governed by the rule of law.  
As shown above, the motives for joining regional integration groupings vary and 
depends on each country or region.  While there are benefits associated with 
economic integration such as the reduction of poverty and development in some 
countries of the world, for Africa such benefits are yet to be seen.  African countries 
continue to witness increasing levels of poverty and poor development while foreign 
businesses and multinational companies remain the main beneficiaries of the 
economic integration model. 
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                                                     CHAPTER 2 
              African Regional Integration: Legal and Institutional Framework 
2.1.                                            INTRODUCTION:  
With the transformation of the OAU to AU, there was joy in Africa and beyond that 
finally Africa would move towards peace, stability, and socio-economic 
development.121 In strengthening the African integration process, the AU has made 
progress in reinforcing institutional development and has adopted a number of non-
binding initiatives such as Pan African Parliament (PAP), New Partnership for African 
Development (NEPAD) and African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to promote inter 
alia, regional integration; good governance; rule of law; improve Africa’s trade; 
participate in the global economy; and eradicate poverty while improving living 
conditions.122  
The adoption of these non-binding initiatives by the AU are informed by the 
understanding that institutions are an important aspect of development and that 
institutions play an important role in providing the right frameworks for regional 
integration.  For instance, cited in Fagbayibo, Rodrick, Subramanian, and Trebbi’sview 
that “the quality of institutions trumps everything else”123 should inform the 
foundational basis of the institution building process in Africa. The movement towards 
institutionalism is centered around the Eurocentric understanding that strong 
institutions result in higher efficiency and qualitative output.124 However, African 
leaders ignore the fact that strong legal systems supported European institutions.125  
Formal institutions in Africa have been met with skepticism and resistance. For 
instance, Fagbayibo observes that the operational processes of the AU have been 
mainly intergovernmental.126 According to Fagbayibo, member countries, through the 
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AU Assembly, continue to be leading role players in the decision- making processes 
of the body.127 As such, the institutions mandated to exercise supranational powers 
over member states are yet to be given legislative powers.  
Fagbayibo opines that the AU Assembly has displayed little commitment in exercising 
the political will for supranationalism to thrive.128 This is demonstrated in the 
assembly’s refusal to cede partial or full legislative powers to the Pan African 
Parliament (PAP), the failure to practically transform the African Union Commission 
(AUC), to create a framework for harmonisation of RECs, or to make African Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM) process compulsory, as well as in the delayed 
operationalisation of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJ&HR).129  
Olivier observes that the merger of the African Court of Justice (ACJ) with the African 
Court on Human and People’s Rights to form one single court, namely, African Court 
of Justice and Human Rights (ACJ&HR) is not in force yet. As of February 2015, only 
30 countries had signed the protocol and only five had ratified the protocol establishing 
the court.130 Olivier submits that the refusal to ratify the protocol is an indication of 
African leaders’ hesitancy to achieve strong human rights enforcement by 
supranational institutions that might overstep on their sovereignty.  
Olivier notes that in the EU, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) expanded its case 
law approving the direct effect as a permanent feature of EU law.131 The Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU) is silent on the issue of community law and its application in 
relation to national laws but only calls for member states to harmonise their national 
policies in order to attain their stated goals as provided under OAU.132 With the OAU 
principles of non-interference, territorial integrity and sovereignty, the charter ensures 
that no community law or supranational law applies to national laws of member 
countries.133  
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African leaders remain hesitant in granting supranational status to central institutions 
and this is not only directly linked to the deep-rooted principle of state sovereignty that 
govern African affairs but also in most African countries, power is concentrated in a 
few powerful government officials. While it is important to acknowledge, and 
appreciate the minimum role that has been played by these different institutions under 
the difficult circumstances, they have been unable to promote African regional 
integration. Under such circumstances, their capacity is extremely limited. In other 
words, the decision making remains the prerogative of Heads of States. 
2.2                    From Organisation of African Unity to African Union 
Extreme mismanagement of the economies, high levels of political and bureaucratic 
corruption, political turmoil, and poor economic performance were some of the 
challenges confronted by Africa throughout mid-to-late twentieth century.134 
Nevertheless, African leaders have always embraced integration and have perceived 
it as a means of addressing Africa’s problems. For instance, African leaders such as 
Nkrumah and Nyerere called for unity among Africans in the fight against colonialism. 
Nkrumah believed that political integration was important and a necessity for Africa’s 
development. He argued that “African Unity, is above all, a political kingdom which can 
be gained by political means. The social and economic development of Africa will 
come only within the political kingdom, not the other way around.”135  
Nkrumah asserted that integration was not confined to the liberation of African people 
but also meant being able to attract foreign direct investment and peaceful co-
existence.136 According to him, unity was a necessity based on cooperation in defence, 
foreign affairs, diplomacy, common citizenships and African economic and monetary 
union.137 He rejected Nyerere’s theory to integration, calling it “balkanisation that is 
susceptible to the promotion of neo-colonial agenda.”138 He argued that Nyerere’s call 
for gradual integration ignored the link and complexity of problems facing African 
countries. In contrast, Nyerere believed that as the liberation of Africa is a gradual 
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process, so is unity.139 Following independence, coups and political conflicts 
confronted the continent. The assassinations and overthrow of African leaders who 
were regarded as ‘hostile to the vested economic and strategic interest’140 of the 
former colonial powers was common.  
Murithi observes that after independence, African leaders gave little support to the 
doctrine of Pan-Africanism.141 Under the guise of sovereignty, non-intervention and 
territorial integrity most African leaders, majority of whom were dictators, committed 
human rights violations against their own people.142 For instance, Murithi observes 
that the Rwandan genocide occurred under the leadership of the OAU.143  
Mbaku observes that after independence, corruption and rent seeking had become 
prevalent in nearly all African countries.144 Mbaku submits that independence provided 
an opportunity for ruling political elites to undermine national laws to enrich themselves 
at the expense of their people.145 Because these political leaders viewed 
decolonisation and independence as an opportunity for them to capture the structures 
of colonial power, and use them to redistribute income and wealth in their favour, they 
failed to transform the former colonialist structures in crucial areas and promote 
democratic constitution-making either in the pre- or post-independence period.146  
Mbaku attributes this political background to the fact that the legal and institutional 
frameworks that developed in these countries after independence were unable to 
sufficiently restrain the government, allowing the ruling elites to act with impunity.147 
Matlosa observes that former Ugandan leader Idi Amin was one of the most brutal and 
autocratic governments in Africa and committed atrocities not only to his own 
people.148 This ranged from arbitrary killings to extreme human rights violations. 
Matlosa observes that the OAU, adhering to the principles of sovereignty and non-
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interference, failed to intervene, and in so doing allowed impunity free rein in Uganda. 
This situation was further worsened when Amin became the Chairperson of the 
OAU.149 According to Matlosa this was the most clear demonstration of the OAU’s 
disregard for human rights abuses by its member countries, protected under the guise 
of non-interference in national matters.150  
Aka credits the prevailing condition at that time to the failure of political elites to 
transform their countries in accordance with the democratic wishes of their political 
groups after gaining independence 151 These leaders opted to inherit the former 
colonial structures and systems without transforming them to reflect the change to 
independence. Eventually, these leaders lost the popular support of their disgruntled 
followers and became cruel. Thus, deeds committed by African leaders to remain in 
power hindered the development of Africa.152  
According to Aka, African leaders opted to retain and strengthen their political power 
over economic development thereby neglecting development, which led them to 
embrace dependent development and external aid, while they were insincerely 
committed to development.153 Aka submits that in relinquishing policy direction to 
others and permitting outsiders to design and oversee development, African leaders 
disregarded their role in development.154  
Africa was a continent facing a variety of challenges, especially political turmoil that 
resulted in assassinations of African leaders by the west and human rights violations 
by African leaders against their own people. This resulted in economic development 
being sacrificed. The biggest achievement of the OAU remains the successful 
decolonisation of the entire African continent and the dismantling of the apartheid 
system. Nevertheless, the OAU has failed to promote economic development and 
eradicate poverty.  
2.3                                Background to the African Union 
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The decision to transform OAU to AU was applauded and was hailed as the beginning 
of a new era for Africa. The AU launch received enormous support from almost all 
African leaders and was a widely-celebrated ceremony among bureaucracies in Africa 
and beyond.155 The AU was formally launched in 2002 in Durban, South Africa. The 
OAU was considered  inadequate to address the 21st century challenges facing the 
continent.156 According to the former president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, “the 
Constitutive Act establishing the AU is the supreme law of the continent that has been 
approved by all our parliaments and it is for the parliament of the African people to 
meet the challenges facing Africa today.”157  
2.4                             AU Legal and Institutional Framework 
 
2.4.1                               African Constitutive Act 
In terms of the AU Constitutive Act, African leaders and their governments committed 
themselves to ‘promote and protect human and peoples’ rights, ‘consolidate 
democratic institutions and ensure good governance and rule of law’.158 The 
Constitutive Act is the supreme law of the AU.159 The objectives of the AU are found 
in article 3 and include, among others, ‘the achievement of greater unity and solidarity 
between the African countries and the peoples of Africa;160 ‘the political and socio-
economic integration of the continent,’161 ‘peace, security, and stability on the 
continent,’162 democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good 
governance,163 human rights and people’s rights,164 to play a role in global economy 
and international negotiations.’165  
The Act further sets the goals of ‘sustainable development at the economic, social and 
cultural levels, as well as integration of African economies,’166 ‘cooperating in all fields 
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of human activities to raise living standards of African peoples’167 and the 
‘harmonisation between existing and future regional economic communities for the 
gradual attainment of the objectives of the African Union.’168  
The principles governing the AU are the participation of the African people in the 
activities of the African union, the right of the union to intervene in cases of political 
instability and restore peace, respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule 
of law and good governance, and social justice to ensure economic development.169  
The Act further condemns and rejects unconstitutional change of governments.170 
Notably, article 4 (h) of the AU Constitutive Act allows the AU to intervene in Member 
States in cases of political instability to restore peace and stability in countries involved 
in conflicts.  Nevertheless, Fagbayibo observe that this provision is not without its 
problems. This author notes that there are a number of challenges that persist and 
hamper the effectiveness of the intervention processes such as inadequate 
operational capacity.171 For example, he opines that even when clear violations occur, 
the AU has limited budget and insufficient human capacity for the speedy and 
sustainable deployment to deal with such hostility or warfare172 
2.4.2                                The African Union Assembly 
In terms of article 6 (1), the AU Assembly is composed of heads of Heads of State and 
government. It is authorised to take several decisions. In terms of Article 6(2) of the 
Constitutive Act, the Assembly is the supreme body of the AU. Olivier submits that 
despite the lack of clarity on the meaning of ‘supreme organ’, it may be inferred that it 
enjoys the highest position in the hierarchy of AU organs or that its decisions cannot 
be challenged by any other organs including the Court of Justice.173 AU Assembly 
determines and monitors the policies of the Union and ensures their implementation 
by the Member States, considers and decides on reports and recommendations from 
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other organs, considers requests for membership and establishes any organ of the 
Union.174  
Moreover, any failure to comply with decisions or policies of the AU Assembly may be 
dealt with by sanctions and such sanctions are regarded as binding on member 
states.175 Furthermore, a failure to pay or make financial contribution to the AU may 
be dealt with by a denial of the right to speak at meetings or to vote or to elect a 
candidate for a position.176 In addition, in terms of article 30, unconstitutional change 
of government or governments who came through coups may be suspended or denied 
a right to participate in AU activities. For instance, the AU has previously suspended 
Central African Republic, Egypt, Madagascar, and Mali after coups in these countries. 
More recently, the AU took a stand against one of the leading pioneers of African 
integration agenda, the late Libyan leader Gaddafi and condemned his government.177 
Nevertheless, AU’s approach on the Zimbabwean government showed some 
inconsistences as it failed to address the Zimbabwe crisis decisively and followed a 
different approach when confronted with Zimbabwe.178  
2.4.3                                       Criticism of the AU 
The AU and its leadership have failed to include the African people or to gain popular 
support for regional integration.179 Furthermore, questions have been raised about the 
capacity of the AU to “meet the economic effects of its policy objectives,”180 since most 
of the objectives are seen by some critics as being the representation of the western 
agenda to maintain their advantages in global trade.181 Additionally, the AU has 
neglected to give clarity on the status of some of the subsisting organs of the 
discontinued OAU such as the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.182  
Welz submits that even though the AU has managed to address some of the 
challenges facing the organisation, it cannot be expected that these challenges can 
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be addressed within a year or even years, as most of the challenges are structural and 
will take many years to address.183 He concludes that the AU standard of success 
must be judged on the approach and the attitude the AU takes in dealing with these 
challenges and not the outcome of its policies.184   
Nevertheless, it remains doubtful whether the AU can address the 21st century 
challenges facing the African continent, especially the rising inequality and poverty 
that threatens the well-being of ordinary Africans, since the AU politicises policies that 
seek to address these challenges.  
The AU has been unable to deal with the political instabilities, human rights violations, 
and lack of respect for the rule of law in Africa since these challenges continue to 
torment the continent. Judging from the previous experiences with the AU, the AU has 
been inconsistent and selective in dealing with continental issues. This affects the 
credibility of the AU and raises questions about its commitment to rule of law. 
2.4.4        African Economic Community Treaty (AEC Treaty) and RECs 
Regional economic communities (RECs) are intergovernmental organisations 
established by groups of states to promote economic relations and cooperation.185 The 
objective of the African AEC Treaty is to strengthen the existing RECs, promote 
harmonisation and coordination of policies and activities of RECs with a view to 
creating a single African Economic Community.186 While the RECs are not a new 
phenomenon in Africa, they began to take shape with the adoption of the Lagos Plan 
of Action (LPA) of 1980 and the Final Act of Lagos (FLA). The plan called for member 
states to strengthen the existing RECs and establish in the future, an African Economic 
Community (AEC).187  
The AEC Treaty set in motion a gradual process that would be achieved through 
coordination, harmonisation and progressive integration through a 34-year period in 
six defined stages.188 The AEC uses eight recognised REC as the building blocks for 
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the attainment of African Economic Community.189 The final goal is to achieve an 
economic community by 2028 and with 53 countries it will be the largest economic 
community in the world.190 The community aims to integrate national markets and 
cooperate in production. Member states also pledge themselves to cooperate with 
each other in social, political, and economic issues.191  
The Objectives of the AEC are the harmonisation of national policies, particularly in 
the ﬁelds of trade, currency and ﬁnance, the adoption of a common trade policy 
regarding third-party states; the establishment and maintenance of a common external 
tariff; the establishment of a common market; the gradual removal of obstacles among 
member states, to the free movement of persons, goods, services, capital and other 
factors.192  
The major challenges confronting the RECs is the lack of an enforcement mechanism 
and missed deadlines. This situation is further worsened by multiple membership 
within the RECs which makes it difficult for them to attain their regional economic 
integration objectives.193 To address these challenges, a protocol on the Relationship 
between the AEC and REC was signed in 1998 with a view to harmonising these 
contradictory policies. It aimed to bring the RECs under the supervision of the AEC.194 
The protocol will also serve as an efficient instrument and framework for close 
cooperation, program harmonisation and coordination of RECs.195 The stated goals of 
the protocol are the formalisation, consolidation, and promotion of closer cooperation 
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between the RECs and the African Union. It also aims to coordinate the projects of the 
Constitutive Act and the AEC treaty.196   
Oppong observes that even though RECs are regarded as building blocks of the AEC, 
they are not parties in the AEC Treaty.197 Consequently, decisions of the AEC do not 
bind RECs and only the member countries that are parties to the AEC treaty are 
obliged to comply with decisions of the AEC.198 The RECs enjoy their own legal status 
separately from member states.199 In other words, member countries cannot sign 
international treaties or agreements with a view to bind the RECs they belong to. 
Similarly, the protocol does not have a binding obligation on the RECs.200  
Therefore, the status of RECs within the AEC is not clear and their future after the 
establishment of the AEC is also uncertain.201 Oppong recommends the negotiation 
of a merger protocol to tackle, among other things, issues concerning the legal status 
of the RECs after the establishment of the AEC; the assets and liabilities of the RECs 
after the merger; whether the merger is compulsory or voluntary and when the merger 
is to occur, namely, whether it will take place simultaneously for all RECs or 
incrementally after each REC attains the needed stage of integration; the status of 
their personnel and status of active RECs such as SACU which are not recognised as 
building blocks.202 For Oppong, it was expected that the treaty would address these 
issues after the establishment of the AEC since the RECs were already in existence 
before the AEC treaty.203  
Additionally, with the establishment of a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) now at 
an advanced stage and the formation of the AEC seemingly difficult to achieve, it is 
important to reconsider the issue of the status of the RECs in case the CFTA is fully 
realised.204 Importantly, such deliberations should clarify the status of RECs after the 
creation of the CFTA, in particular, whether the RECs will need to be halted or proceed 
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with the creation of their customs union after the CFTA is successfully launched or 
whether the discussions around the formation of the customs union will be done at the 
continental level.205  Also important to clarify is the status of the RECs after the 
establishment of the AEC, in other words, whether the  RECs will dissolve completely 
or would continue to function in the current manner.206  
Furthermore, the AEC treaty does not have a distinct legal status from the AU. The 
AU also performs the activities of the AEC.207  Mutai observes that this arrangement 
has been slammed as impractical since the institutions of the former OAU (now AU) 
are characterised by its political nature and therefore may be unable to take on 
additional technical responsibility required by the AEC.208 Mutai also notes that there 
is no mention of enforcement of decisions or procedure for settling disputes regarding 
the implementation of the Treaty.209 Cited in Saurombe, Ng’ong’ola sumbit that the 
political nature of the AU cannot handle the technical responsibilities that the Abuja 
Treaty might require.210  AU attempts at rationalisation of REC undertakings are found 
in the work of the annual Conference of African Ministers in Charge of Integration 
(COMAI).211 The institution has met on several occasions and each conference 
acknowledged the significant role played by RECs as a vital support system for 
achieving continental integration. In addition, it emphasised the need to streamline 
and harmonise the activities and programmes of RECs, with the aim of fast-tracking 
the African integration project.212  
2.4.5           New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD 
The adoption of New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 
2001 was a direct response to both political and economic challenges facing the 
continent and with the establishment of NEPAD, there were expectations that Africa 
will promote good governance, human rights, eradicate poverty, and increase 
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economic growth.213 NEPAD was inspired by former Presidents of South Africa, Thabo 
Mbeki, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria and Hosni 
Mubarak of Egypt, as well as President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal.214 
Gathii observes that NEPAD begins with reviewing Africa's place and plight in the 
global economy215, as well as issues of mismanagement and bad governance that still 
continue to torment Africa while acknowledging the new political will of African leaders 
to redress these problems.216 It also calls on African people and encourages them to 
"take up the challenge of mobilising in support of the implementation"217 of NEPAD 
with the aim of ending Africa's marginalisation and to "ensure its development by 
linking with the developed countries."218  
 
2.4.6                                Criticism of NEPAD 
The critics of NEPAD disapprove of the theoretical framework of the plan and view it 
as an obsession with neoliberalism, and believe it is another western driven agenda, 
only designed to benefit foreign capital, the urban economies and a small number of 
privileged indigenous leaders at the exclusion of the poor.219 These critics argue that 
further integration of Africa into the international system under the existing 
environment will worsen the continent's already gloomy economic position and 
downgrade it further to the control of the global economic system.220  
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While Africa’s growing economies may be attributed to NEPAD’s neoliberal policies, 
the plan is yet to transform itself as an agent of social change, especially for the poor 
African citizens. Consequently, 16 years since its establishment, it has been unable to 
deal with the rising inequality and poverty in Africa. As previously noted, the neoliberal 
policies that have been adopted in Africa (including NEPAD)  are the direct results of 
the rising inequality and poverty between the rich and poor ordinary citizens. 
Therefore, the criticism is justified and well founded. 
Nevertheless, Akokpari observes that the criticism is strengthened by the fact that 
there is generally lack of visible contacts between NEPAD and Africa’s previous 
domestic development programmes such as Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the 
unexplained change of name strongly gives some credibility to this view. Furthermore, 
NEPAD’s partnership with international creditors [and questions about its ownership 
and origin] further strengthens the perception that it is a western driven plan.221 
Ndayi argues that while NEPAD theoretical framework clearly follow neoliberal 
policies, ‘its embedded liberalism is par to excellence.’222 Ndayi observes that the 
entrenched liberal viewpoint of the NEPAD is concealed behind the plan’s social policy 
that advocates for, among other things, wealth redistribution, social protection etc.223 
Accordingly, this embedded liberalism advancing social policy is revealed within the 
NEPAD document that shows a policy change from narrow economic policy that is 
centered around economic outcomes to broader social development policy system in 
Africa.224 Ndayi observes that the plan openly criticises economic growth that does not 
place importance on socio-economic development and demands active involvement 
of government in the delivery of basic social services at domestic level.225 Ndayi notes 
that this entrenched liberalism is demonstated in South Africa through campaigns such 
as ‘Proudly South African’ and ‘Buy South African’ aimed at encouraging the private 
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sector and consumers to make use of local services and buy locally produced 
goods.226 
While Ndayi reveals important provisions of the plan that seek to address the social 
issues facing the continent, these plans will remain paper based as long as Africa does 
not challenge the unfair trading practices by the developed countries that further 
contribute to Africa’s impoverishment and marginalisation. For instance, even if 
government encourages citizens to buy locally produced goods, local producers still 
find it difficult to compete with the cheap subsided goods of the Western countries. 
Therefore, it may be important to rather protect certain key domestic industries against 
adverse competition from the western countries in order to not only to save jobs but 
also protect the economic welfare of poor African citizens.  
Akokpari observes that with respect to good governance, the setup of NEPAD is 
positive. This author notes that new global governance emphasises good governance 
and human rights. A country rejecting this call risks isolation, western aid, and 
investments.227 Akokpari argues that it was this global disregard for undemocratic 
practices that encouraged African civil societies to advocate for democratic reforms.228 
Consequently, under the new international order, advocacy groups across the 
continent can challenge the state, to pressure the state and prevent government from 
acting with impunity.229 . Akokpari observes that this has led to and encouraged the 
widespread demand for an accountable and transparent government across the 
continent.230  
Keet submits that NEPAD ignores the fact that there are challenges facing the poor 
developing countries, particularly in Africa, in applying the legal and institutional 
requirements of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).231 NEPAD overlooks the fact 
that it is the most dominant western countries that have deliberately avoided 
implementing Uruguay Round Agreements (URA) terms that they regard as hostile to 
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their interests.232  Keet observes that predominantly, the US is guilty of sidetracking 
its Uruguay Round commitments to eliminate its tariff and quota restrictions on textile 
and clothing exports from developing countries.233  
Gathii submits that NEPAD does not sufficiently deal with unfair international trade 
and commerce rules that are devised, applied, and accepted in a manner that is 
detrimental to Africa.234 Gathii contends that although NEPAD contains provisions that 
acknowledge these unfair rules and their devastating impact on Africa, it does not 
sufficiently address the World Trade Organisation's (WTO) agricultural rules, which 
cause African governments to lose billions in revenue.235  
Keet notes that despite evidence of inequalities in the global trading system, NEPAD 
welcomes the new trading opportunities that are offered by the multilateral trading 
system. She notes that NEPAD embraced the multilateral trading system despite the 
fact that in the last stages of the Uruguay Round, the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) had calculated and warned that Africa would lose 
out billions of dollars in the following years.236  
Gathii observes that while NEPAD does also call for recognition of Africa's special 
concerns, needs and interests in future WTO rules, it does not refer to past rules.237 
For example, Gathii submits that subsidies to cotton production by Western countries 
have reduced the commodity prices for cotton that it is no longer worthwhile for West 
African farmers to continue to grow cotton.238 African cotton producers have a 
comparative advantage in cotton production but are unable to realise the benefits of 
such advantage.239  
According to Keet, it may be possible that the policy makers and political drivers of 
NEPAD are unaware of such outrageous abuses. Keet submits that if they are 
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unaware, then it must be said that they do not have the skill, ability, and capacity to 
develop a holistic approach for the African continent.240  
For Gathii, a mere attempt to work within the current legal rules without opposing them 
or to have them revised and amended is to downplay the problems facing African 
products in developed countries markets241 He submits that instead of challenging 
WTO rules that are hostile to Africa, NEPAD merely calls for assistance in capacity 
building to strengthen negotiating teams as well as the implementation of WTO rules 
by African countries.242  
Ndayi citing a significant number of data, observes that NEPAD is achieving its goal 
of ensuring that Africa participates in the global economy through economic 
plurilateralism. Ndayi attributes this success to, among other things, NEPAD’s friendly 
environment for investment, including progress in Africa’s trade policy, which has 
discouraged protectionism and has increased market access to developed  
countries.243 Ndayi further observes that Africa has increased its trade and intra-
regional African trade continues to grow while external trade has been increasing. 
Ndayi attributes this growth to the economic plurilateral nature of NEPAD.244  
While these developments are encouraging, they are yet to produce material benefits 
to the lives of ordinary African citizens. Transforming this economic growth from 
economic data to social issues and improving the wellbeing of the poor is a major 
problem facing the continent. Despite Africa contains six of the fastest growing 
economies in the world, these countries and Africa in general continue to face high 
levels of inequality and extreme poverty. 
Gathii concludes that NEPAD's adoption of a market based development strategy is 
no more than an attempt to secure new aid, credit, and investment from the West.245 
He submits that this may explain why the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has 
applauded and welcomed the NEPAD agenda.246 Wolff argues that endorsement of 
the Bretton Woods institutions policies and their structural reforms programmes 
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without challenging the unfair international trading rules and commerce downplays the 
fact that these neoliberal policies have proven that they are not suitable for the African 
continent and are detrimental to the people of Sub-Saharan Africa.247   
Ndayi submits that despite the theoretical framework of the plan being neo-liberal, 
NEPAD should not be assessed in terms of ideological design only, but on conditions 
that led to the adoption of neoliberal policies in NEPAD.248 Ndayi observes that issues 
such as poor intra-African trade and abundant extra-regional opportunities, as well as 
the need to avoid self-imposed marginalisation are some of the conditions that led to 
the adoption of neo-liberal policies.249 
The author is of the view that the successes and failures of NEPAD must be judged 
not on macro-economic outcomes but on its ability to effect real change on the poor. 
After all, poverty and inequality are the biggest challenges facing the African continent. 
Nevertheless, NEPAD plan seems to be over-ambitious and gives the impression that 
it was hastily drafted and endorsed without really considering African realities and the 
challenges that African countries encounter especially on the international stage. Even 
though it has managed to address some of the challenges hampering the continent, 
most of the challenges that have been identified still persist. It is necessary that the 
NEPAD document be reviewed and modified to place prominence on poverty 
alleviation programmes and address the income gap between the rich and poor. 
2.4.7                                 Pan African Parliament (PAP) 
In 2001, the Pan African Parliament (PAP) Protocol was adopted and its vision is to 
evolve into an institution with full legislative powers, whose members are elected by 
universal adult suffrage.250 The main objectives of the PAP are primarily to facilitate 
the effective implementation of the policies and objectives of the then OAU/AEC and 
ultimately those of the AU.251 
Its objectives are further to educate the peoples of Africa about the objectives and 
policies aimed at integrating the African continent within the larger framework of the 
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AU,252 to promote self-reliance,253 co-operation,254 peace and security in Africa.255 
Most importantly, the objective of the PAP is to encourage good governance 256and to 
promote the principles of human rights and democracy in Africa.257 Its advisory and 
consultative powers incude efforts aimed at the legal harmonisation or coordination 
between member countries.258   
After 15 years since PAP was established, it is yet to acquire supranational status. 
Udombana is of the view that this is because the African leaders do not want to subject 
the AU authority and control to any other political organ in relation to policy formulation 
and the creation of binding decisions.259 For Mpanyane, this means that its ‘decisions’, 
primarily its resolutions and recommendations, are merely advisory to the AU and its 
structures are mandated to make policy decisions on behalf of the continent.260 
Mpanyane submits that the problem with this is that the recommendations, opinions 
or submissions are not mandatory; the AU policy-making institutions are not compelled 
to consult with the PAP or seek its opinion in their decision-making processes.261 
Mpanyane opines that PAP recommendations and opinions therefore, by their very 
nature, have no binding force.262  
Olivier observes that PAP can only achieve its full legislative powers if members agree 
to amend the protocol and argues that a separate agreement will be required.263  
Olivier notes that in 2009, a review of the protocol was requested by the AU 
commission and a draft amendment was approved with reservation, and in 2013 the 
Commission felt that more in depth consultation was necessary.264 However, nothing 
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really came out of that and as things stand, PAP still does not have legislative powers 
and enforcement mechanisms.265  
According to Mpanyane, any review or assessment towards the transformation of the 
PAP must necessarily include the review and transformation of other related AU 
governance institutions too.266 This means that if the PAP is transformed into a 
legislative body, there will be a need for an executive and a judiciary to complement 
the PAP.267 Furthermore, the parliamentarians are not elected by vote as was 
envisioned by the protocol and currently each member country has five 
representatives in parliament.268 Consequently, the independence and impartiality of 
the PAP is compromised and raises questions about its credibility and ability to 
achieve its mandate. This view is supported by the possibility that those 
parliamentarians elected might have overriding loyalty to their own countries.269   
Cilliers and Mashele observe that Article 2 also states that the parliamentarians are 
the representatives of all African people and that the five MPs chosen from each 
country must “reflect the variety of political opinions in each National Parliament or 
deliberative organ.”270 Cilliers and Mashele are of the view that the principle to guide 
the appointment of the five parliamentarians to the PAP is an important attempt to 
force a minimum political diversity from the constraints of domestic politics.271 They 
submit that the decision by the South African government to exclude the official 
opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA) from its five MPs was disappointing and sent 
a wrong signal to a continent that had entrusted South Africa with the honour of hosting 
PAP on the basis of the quality of its strong constitution and working democracy.272 
In addition, PAP aims to ensure that African people are involved in the development 
and economic integration of the continent. According to Cilliers and Mashele, PAP will 
only succeed in realising its ambition towards popular participation through direct 
elections which is unlikely to happen.273 Additionally, Chilufya notes that the 
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information on the PAP website or on the print media offers very little information about 
the organisation.274 Chilufya submits that PAP needs to develop its own means of 
publicising its role and informing the people about its mandate and objectives since 
there is absence of television coverage, limited press coverage, and almost no radio 
coverage.275   
Olivier observes that the lack of legislative powers and the fact that members are not 
directly elected but nominated at national level, are two key issues hindering the 
transformation of the organisation.276 Cillier and Mashele submit that the biggest 
challenge for PAP would be finding a technical and legal consensus amongst 
Francophone, Anglophone, Lusophone and those African countries with Islamist legal 
systems.277 
However, even though PAP is facing major challenges it has played an important role 
in the African continent.  For instance, PAP condemned Zimbabwean pre-elections 
and the entire electoral process of 2008 and was also very critical of the Sudanese 
government during its observation missions.278 Nevertheless, PAP has very limited 
powers and therefore their work is just advisory and has little impact on the decisions 
of the Assembly. African leaders in 2009, instead of increasing the budget of PAP 
decided to cut its budget which made it difficult for PAP to continue with its work.279  
According to Welz, this move may have been motivated by the fact that some African 
leaders may not be happy with the reports from the observer missions, particularly the 
work and discussions of PAP, including its critique of the observance of democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law.280 For Welz, it is possible that African leaders never 
intended PAP to have supranational powers and had there been such an intention, 
leading countries such as South Africa and Nigeria would have sought to gain more 
seats in their favour, instead of the proportional distribution of seats among member 
states.281 Olivier argues that in order for PAP to become a true democracy parliament, 
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it is important that its evolving law making powers include the infringement of 
sovereignty of member countries similar to the EU system.282  
2.4.8                            African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) 
The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) was established in 2003 in Abuja, 
Nigeria. The APRM is a voluntary self-assessment mechanism for African states 
aimed at improving democratic governance.283 It is aimed at promoting the adoption 
of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic 
growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental 
economic integration.284 APRM is headed by the Committee of Participating Heads of 
State and Government (APR Forum). The general task of the APRM falls on the Panel 
of Eminent Persons (APR Panel), who are documented specialists in one of the four 
thematic areas of APRM appointed by the APR Forum.285 These specialists are 
persons of high moral standing who have displayed a commitment to the doctrine of 
Pan-Africanism.286 
A country that accedes to the APRM commits itself to being reviewed from time to time 
in terms of its policy frameworks, institutional architecture, systemic set-up and 
practices around four thematic areas of governance.287 Upon acceding to the APRM, 
a state commits itself to periodic reviews that are meant to take place every two to four 
years.288 Equally, in certain cases, participating NEPAD heads of state and 
government could be propelled by signs of an imminent socio-economic and or 
political turmoil to call for a review in a given country  to assist the country in 
question.289 
So far, 34 African countries have acceded to the APRM by signing the memorandum 
of understanding. However, not all of the 54 AU member states have acceded to the 
APRM which may be an indication of low commitment to democratic governance in 
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Africa.290 Mangu observes that it was expected that Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal 
and South Africa, whose leaders initiated NEPAD, would be at the forefront  and 
become the first countries to be reviewed, however, they did not, and this meant that 
even those who are the most vocal about NEPAD and APRM may not be very 
committed to the process.291 Instead, Ghana started the process and was followed by 
Rwanda and Kenya.  
The APR Panel discovered that these three countries had signed or ratified several 
international treaties with a bearing on democracy and good political governance. 
However, where ratification occurred, they are not always followed by the 
incorporation of these instruments into domestic law.292 On the other hand, treaties 
were not always enforced when they had been accepted as national laws and the 
countries concerned hardly complied with their reporting obligations on ratification of 
some instruments.293  
The Country Review Report (CRR) found that Ghana had been keen in acceding to, 
and ratifying some regional and international standards and codes, but the country 
had yet to adopt a binding time-frame to accede to, or ratify, outstanding universal and 
regional instruments such as the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child (African Children's Charter) (1990) etc.294 It was recommended that Ghana must 
implement a thoughtful plan to deal with outstanding issues and set up a mechanism 
for automatic compliance with its reporting obligations, to develop a plan and 
programme to incorporate into Ghana's domestic law the ratified covenants and 
conventions, so as to make them an integral part of the country's own enforceable 
standards.295 
 
2.4.9                                  APRM challenges 
Akokpari observes that there are fears of the possibility of African leaders being 
unwilling  to criticise other countries even in the unlikely event of the Independent 
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Panel of Eminent Persons (IPEP) producing critical reports.296 The continental silence 
on human rights violations in countries such as Sudan, Swaziland, and the absence 
of direct criticism of the outrageous and systematic human rights abuses under the 
Zimbabwean government, have sufficiently demonstrated African leaders’ lack of 
moral courage to criticise fellow members.297   
Welz expressed the view that with the appointment of a new chairperson for APRM in 
May 2013, it was hoped that the institution would be more legitimate and truthful in its 
review processes. Yet, African leaders have adopted the practice of reviewing and 
discussing the final reports among themselves before they are available to the public, 
with some of these leaders ignoring the shortcomings in other countries, in the hope 
that they would be treated in the same manner.298  
According to Mangu, when measuring compliance with codes and standards, the peer 
review process contains only a record of the listing of international conventions, 
agreements or treaties that have been or should have been signed, ratified and 
domesticated, with less emphasis on their actual enforcement in national law.299 For  
Mangu, the fact that not all the AU member states have acceded to the APRM is a 
demonstration of low commitment to democratic governance in Africa.300 In addition, 
low commitment to democratic governance is further demonstrated by the slow 
implementation process of APRM.301 
Matlosa submits that the implementation of the National Programme of Actions 
(NPoAs) is another challenge facing the APRM. Reviewed countries have generally 
performed poorly in ensuring effective implementation of NPoAs.302 In most cases 
governments do not allocate financial resources for NPoA implementation in their 
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national budgets, assuming that external donors will provide the requisite resources.303 
According to Matlosa, it is important that African countries depend only on their own 
national budgets for the implementation of NPoAs. This not only protects their national 
sovereignty and reduces their dependence on international aid, but also helps ensure 
national ownership of the APRM.304 
Mangu observes that another difficulty relates to the integrity and independence of the 
APR Panel. Cabinet may have been persuaded to influence the work and to 
compromise the independence of members of the APR Panel.305 Once they receive 
unfavourable findings and recommendations from the APR Panel, cabinets promptly 
question the accuracy of the information, causing inconvenience on APR Panel 
members who then feel constrained  to make decisions favourable to the government 
where Country Self-Assessment Report (CSARs) may have concluded on bad political 
governance.306 
Akokpari notes that the (IPEP) comprises of between five and seven members with at 
least one member from the AU’s major sub-regions.307 Akokpari further observes that 
back in 2003, there was uneasiness about the democratic credentials of nearly all the 
appointees of IPEP. Six of the seven members selected at that time into the IPEP 
were personnel who at one point in their careers had various relations with the leaders 
of their countries.308 
2.4.10                                    Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that African leaders have always embraced African integration 
and that there is a political will at least on paper to pursue regional integration in order 
to address Africa’s complex challenges. However, the challenge is to effectively 
implement agreed policies and creates an environment that will enable the economic 
integration process to succeed and provide material benefits to people of Africa. Over 
the years African Union has made significant strides in supporting the regional 
integration process by setting up a number of institutions and adopting a number of 
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non-binding initiatives to strengthen the African regional integration. While this chapter 
applauds and appreciate these new developments, particularly the minimum role that 
has been played by these institutions, nevertheless this chapter observed that these 
institutions have been unable to promote African regional integration. The next chapter 
will evaluate the effects of weak legal and institutional system in African regional 
integration and generally lack of human capacity to accelerate African regional 
integration.  
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                                                CHAPTER 3 
3.                        Major challenges facing African Regional Integration  
3.1                               Overlapping Memberships 
Muthai argues that the long-established challenge facing trade liberalisation in the 
eastern and southern African region is the lack of a clear, pragmatic policy to guide 
the regional integration process.309 According to Muthai this situation has resulted in 
multiple overlapping regional trade agreements. Even though both the Lagos Plan of 
Action (LPA) and the African Economic Community (AEC) treaty overall goal 
envisioned a united Africa, they unfortunately led to a multiplicity of regional trade 
agreements.310 Although all the regional economic communities (RECs) contain 
similar overall objectives, this did not deter each respective African country from 
joining more than one economic to show solidarity with fellow neighbours 311 
African integration suffers from overlapping memberships. Africa is the only region in 
the world in which almost every country belongs to at least more than one regional 
economic community (REC). For instance, the difficulties of multiple membership are 
found in the case of Zambia which has been a member of both the SADC and the 
COMESA. Under the SADC Trade Protocol Zambia had agreed to remove tariffs for 
SADC members to zero. Thus, since South Africa is a member of SADC, Zambia had 
agreed to remove tariffs to South Africa to zero. On the other hand, Zambia being a 
member of the COMESA Customs Union, had agreed to a common external tariff 
regime for countries that are not members of the COMESA. Because South Africa is 
not a member of the COMESA, this did not apply to South Africa. This means that 
Zambia had agreed to reduce tariffs for South Africa (under the SADC conditions) but 
to maintain tariffs for South Africa (under the COMESA provisions). This situation 
leaves Zambia in a dilemma.312  
Muthai reasons that possibly the best attempt to address this challenge of multiple 
membership is found in the tripartite COMESA-EAC-SADC which aims to harmonise 
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the trade rules of these different communities. According to Muthai, this is encouraging 
but because of the diverging objectives of these three communities, such discussions 
are unlikely to yield any positive outcomes.313 Yet, African leaders continue to commit 
themselves to multiple intra and sub-regional organisations despite the conflicting 
interests and objectives. 
3.1.1                                    Benefits of Multiple Membership 
Gathii submits that multiple memberships demonstrate the aspiration of member 
countries to choose from several options presented by competing Regional Trade 
Agreements (RTAs). He argues that RTAs offer benefits beyond the reduction or 
elimination of tariff barriers and the harmonisation of trade policies.314  
3.1.2                             Criticisms of Multiple Memberships 
For Gathii, African trade treaties are flexible by design and practice.315 He submits that 
these agreements are not designed to commit their signatories to ‘scrupulous and 
rigorous adherence but are designed as flexible regimes of co-operation.’316 He notes 
that these regimes set a framework on a range of issues and aspirations, including 
trade liberalisation and expressly build on the principle of ‘variable geometry’, giving 
poorer members more time to implement agreed trade and other commitments.317 
Accordingly, countries that have multiple membership regard these treaties as a 
framework for cooperation and not as legally binding instruments.318  
Muthai observes that members who are signatories to multiple treaties will encounter 
difficulties in fulfilling their treaty commitments found within the different regional 
communities and this difficulty is attributed to the nature of the founding treaties.319 
For instance, Muthai points out that some of the provisions found in these treaties set 
out ambiguous obligations, and the period required to meet these obligations are 
unrealistic.320 
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Fagbayibo argues that as long as African integration is characterised by the presence 
of multiple RECs with overlapping and duplicated membership, integration will remain 
an illusion.321 Fagbayibo submits that integration cannot be achieved under its current 
arrangement in which member countries are pulling in different directions. Fagbayibo 
further maintains that to effectively proceed with the rationalisation process, it is 
important to firstly determine the feasibility and workability of each REC and their role 
in advancing the regional integration process.322 This detailed investigation should 
establish, among other things, issues such as how far each REC’s activity is 
contributing to the achievement of the six defined stages outlined by the AEC treaty, 
the possibility of limiting the membership of states to one REC, the harmonisation of 
their policies, and the effects of narrowing down the number of the RECs to five.323 
Cited in Gathii, Jagdish Bhagwati refers to this surge of bilateral and regional trade 
agreements as the ‘spaghetti bowl’, submits that multiple regional and bilateral trade 
agreements are stumbling blocks for multilateral trade rules rather than building 
blocks.324 Since the key objective of these trade agreements is to liberalise trade within 
these communities, Bhagwati argues that these agreements have discriminatory 
effects for trade facilitation. Bhagwati submits that lack of harmonisation caused by 
difficult sets of inconsistent rules of origin found in multiple RTAs results in high 
transaction costs for business and hampers trade flows.325  
Tavares and Tang note that the task of applying different rules of origin (RoOs) for 
each regional agreement becomes unmanageable, taking away the benefits from 
trade liberalisation and delaying the deepening of regional trade relations.326 In 
addition, these difficult sets of conflicting  rules also prevent trade creation as the 
partners are forced to accept the products of an inefficient domestic producer, since 
the countries bound by these rules are required to purchase their products from the 
less efficient producer.327   
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Hartzenberg, Erasmus, and Kingombe observe that companies doing business in 
these countries must comply with diverging and conflicting rules and procedures; 
increasing the cost of doing business in these countries and causing repetition.328 
Since the African integration model foresees that all RECs will ultimately become 
Customs Unions (CUs), countries belonging to more than one CU will encounter 
unforeseen problem because of their multiple and conflicting memberships.329  
Gathii submit that the incidence of multiple memberships in African RTAs is influenced 
by historical circumstances, as well as political and ideological debates such as the 
need to share natural resources330  He submits that in Africa, RTAs are not regarded 
as trade regimes but rather serve multiple purposes as frameworks for coordination of 
development projects.331 
3.2                 Refusal by African leaders to cede aspects of their sovereignty. 
According to Uzodike, effective regional integration requires a measure of shared 
sovereignty which means that countries must surrender aspects of their sovereignty 
to supranational institutions.332 Uzodike submits that the evidence indicates that most 
African governments are unwilling to cede their control over fiscal and monetary issues 
to RECs.333 Uzodike argues that long-term regional objectives have continued to be 
paper goals because African governments have been reluctant to subordinate their 
national decision-making to the commands of RECs and this is demonstrated in the 
little or no national support for RECs.334  
Kiplagat submits that state sovereignty in Africa is used by African leaders to 
concentrate political control.  African leaders support state sovereignty to preserve 
their power and increase their wealth.335 These leaders have realised that regional 
integration would take their political power away from them, hence the culture of 
conservatism.336 Consequently, disintegration and slow implementation of regional 
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agreements in Africa is attributed to adherence to the state sovereignty principle and 
to the fact that regional institutions mandated to enforce these regional agreements 
are either weak or non-existent.337  
In the opinion of Hartzenberg, Erasmus, and Kingombe, African regional institutions 
such as RECs lack supranational status. The REC institutions are characterised by 
unclear mandates and unclear powers. The monitoring of compliance with community 
rules is weak and the communal voice is silent.338 According to them, sovereignty is 
best understood as a legal concept which safeguards territorial integrity and 
jurisdiction; but which also involves state action to comply with international 
commitments.339  
Hartzenberg, Erasmus, and Kingombe submit that African governments must 
understand that sovereignty requires that international agreements be implemented 
and are extremely important to guide the regional processes.340 Importantly, courts 
that are established will make judgements not only against private parties who 
approach them in which they enjoy jurisdiction but also against the same government 
or institution that created such courts.341 These issues should be considered before 
they are expressed as provisions governing international agreements.342 
3.3                                       Lack of political commitment   
Asante observes that the lack of commitment to regionalism has displayed itself in 
member states individually progressing their own strategies, plans, and priorities, with 
little attention given to regional co-operation reflected in them.343 Asante opines that 
although African countries continue to speak of collective action for regional 
integration, no single state has yet designed its national plans to be consistent with 
the promotion of effective integration for development.344 According to Asante, if 
political commitment is lacking from the national government, then the government 
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itself can be considered a barrier to development or a central cause of failure of policy 
direction.345 
However, Gathii submits that African regional trade agreements are not based on a 
detailed approach that focuses on whether member states are complying with regional 
treaty commitments. Equally, regionalism can be realised not only out of formal 
institutions but outside of such formal structures.346  
Hartzenberg, Erasmus, and Kingombe note that the SADC Treaty does envisage 
sanctions against members that continuously fail to meet its integration and trade 
commitments taken up under the Treaty, or when they implement measures which 
undermine the principles and goals of SADC.347 Hartzenberg, Erasmus, and 
Kingombe submit that the suspension of the SADC Tribunal demonstrates the 
difficulties encountered regarding ensuring rules-based governance through regional 
organisations.348  
The difficulty and influence of politics in regional integration is found in the existing 
institutions established in support of African regional arrangements. Regional projects 
are completely undermined before they even begin due to the limited legislative 
powers afforded to regional institutions.349 African governments have been unwilling 
to empower regional institutions and this can be attributed to the importance of state 
sovereignty and the complex nature of economic issues.350 Consequently, African 
regional secretariats have been weak organisations that lack the necessary legislative 
powers. In most instances, supreme decision making bodies follow the top-down 
approach with decisions only the prerogatives of the ruling political elites.351 
Muthai argues that the implementation challenges are closely linked and mainly 
revolve around capacity. According to Muthai, lack of capacity has delayed regional 
integration both at the national and the regional level.352 This incapacity is 
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demonstrated by weak financial and human resources. In respect of financial 
limitations, member states sometimes encounter difficulties in meeting their financial 
obligations. From the human resources perspective, there is a severe lack of expertise 
in both the legal and economic sectors.353 The small number of experts find 
themselves overstretched when dealing with the demands at either multilateral,  
regional or bilateral levels.354 
Lack of political commitment has slowed down regonal integration and demonstrates 
the inability of regional laws and institutions to effectively hold  member countries to 
account. On the other hand, poor implementation may be prompted by genuine 
national policy considerations or circumstances.  
 
3.4                                      Lack of Popular Support 
Uzodike observes that African regional integration agenda lacks popular support from 
ordinary African citizens, civil society, and private sector and submits that African 
leaders have failed to galvanise popular support for the integration project.355 
Hartzenberg, Erasmus, and Kingombe note that African regional integration is a state-
centric attempt, with a top-down approach which differs significantly with that of other 
regions.356 For instance, in East Asia the private sector to a larger extent than in Africa 
is actively involved in the integration project, while regional production networks 
promote the establishment of  deep regional integration arrangements that go further 
than reducing tariffs.357 
Fagbayibo submits that the difficulty with the integration process in Africa is that the 
people are left out from issues concerning the integration project.358 Decisions and 
policies coming from regional integration are neither subjected to referendums nor to 
open discussion with the general public affected by those decisions or policies. As a 
result the general public either know very little or are not really aware about the 
                                                          
353  Ibid at 95-96. 
354  Ibid at 96. 
355  Uzodike op cit at 36. 
356  Cited in Trudi Hartzenberg, Gerhard Erasmus, and Christian K.M. Kingombe at 1. 
357  Ibid. 
358  Fagbayibo op cit note 320 at 57 / 536. 
55 
 
integration process and hence add little or no significance to the regional 
institutions.359 
Cited in Aka, according to the movement for popular participation in development 
(MPPD) in Africa, it is important that ordinary African citizens and the private sector be 
involved in formulating, building, and designing the public policies aimed at improving 
their own economic welfare and fully and effectively participate in the decisions which 
affect their daily lives at all sectors of government and society.360 Development is 
sustained when its direction is outlined by the people and consists of risks and 
sacrifices that they can accept.361   
Indeed, integration without the support of ordinary people and private sector becomes 
hollow. It is important that ordinary African citiezens and private sector be at the 
forefront of African integration and to formulate its direction.  
 
 
3.5           Other Challenges to African Regional Integration  Related to Trade  
World Trade Organisation (WTO) Director-General Roberto Azevêdo observed inter 
alia that intra-African trade remains just a tenth of Africa’s total trade, cost of moving 
goods within Africa is double the global average, and that an African company faces 
an average tariff of 8.7 percent when selling within Africa, against 2.5 percent 
elsewhere.362 Azevêdo argued that addressing these barriers would assist in driving 
African integration at the international stage. He observes that with the introduction of 
the Trade Facilitation Agreement in 2013, it is expected that when it is fully 
implemented, the Agreement could reduce trade costs by an average of 14.5 
percent.363  
Elbeshbishi submits that trade facilitation reforms increase trade performance by 
improving the quality of the regulatory framework, basic transport, and 
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communications infrastructure.364 Elbeshbishi further submits that the... ‘quality of 
coordination can have a major influence on a company’s decisions about which 
country to locate to, which suppliers to buy from, and which consumer markets to 
enter.’365  
While African countries have recognised the significance of trade facilitation as shown 
by the various agreements signed at bilateral, sub-regional and regional levels as well 
as attempts made at country level, most of these initiatives have so far produced few 
benefits.366 Amoako-Tuffour, Balchin, Calabrese and Mendez-Parra observe that 
beyond these trade facilitation arrangements, the challenge of implementation of trade 
facilitation agreements remains a daunting task.367 Transforming these expressed 
policy provisions in Africa’s regional trade agreements from paper and implementing 
them towards trade facilitation continues to be a major problem.368  
 
3.5.1 Poor infrastructure and high transaction costs 
The quality of infrastructure in Africa is a major problem as most roads are 
deteriorating due to lack of proper maintenance. The situation is more visible in 
landlocked countries as these countries suffer high transaction costs not only from 
their own poor infrastructure but also from that of their transit neighbours.369 Road 
transport continues to be the most leading method of transport within the continent 
and only a quarter is paved.370 The rural area in the continent is inadequately served 
in terms of transport infrastructure and services. Africa has only 34 per cent rural road 
access  as compared to 90 per cent in the rest of the world.371  
For Hartzenberg, not only are most Sub Saharan African economies small and poor, 
but 15 are also landlocked, a major factor to high trade transaction costs, and more 
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generally to the high costs of doing business in Africa.372 Furthermore many other 
blockades exist, escalating the transaction costs of trade. The inadequately and ill 
developed cross-country connections has resulted in transport costs in Africa  being 
the highest and most expensive in the world.373  
Elbeshbishi observes that shipping costs from African countries to major world 
markets are extremely high. Poor infrastructure is a huge factor to high transport costs 
and is an impediment to trade expansion.374 Elbeshbishi submits that challenges such 
as delays to pass through borders, many roadblocks and checkpoints on African 
highways appears to be the pattern in many African countries, which results in 
unnecessary delays and huge increase in transport costs.375 
Amoako-Tuffour, Balchin, Calabrese and Mendez-Parra, observe that in the SADC 
region, discussions around developing the necessary trans-boundary infrastructure to 
facilitate transit trade in SADC has been initiated, with the adoption of SADC Regional 
Infrastructure Development Master Plan (RIDMP) of 2012 offering a comprehensive 
framework through which to facilitate transit trade.376 Numerous strategic trade routes 
within the region have been linked (via connectivity along roads, rail, and ports) 
through development corridor plans such as the Trans-Kalahari Corridor, the Maputo 
Development Corridor, and the North–South Corridor.377  
Elbeshbishi notes that African air transport has made significant strides to connect the 
continent with the rest of the world. Currently,  most African capital cities are connected 
worldwide.378 In particular, after the implementation of the Yamoussoukro Decision 
(YD), there has been a remarkable improvement in air traffic movement in Africa, with  
a growing number of African capitals served by major African airlines such as Egypt 
Air, Ethiopian Airlines etc.379   
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3.5.2                    Tariffs and Non Tariff Barriers (NTBs) 
Africa’s integration into the global economy has been slowed down by the persistence 
of Non Tariff Barriers (NTBs). These barriers have not only hindered the export 
competitiveness of African countries, but have also destabilised their attempts to 
attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).380 While tariffs have progressively been 
reduced around the world, the cost of meeting customs procedures has in certain 
instances exceeded tariff duties.381 For instance, Muthai observes that the problem of 
the use of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures as NTBs to trade, is a long 
established source of contention and frustration for members of the EAC.382 For 
example, Uganda has maintained a ban on the import of Kenyan beef for a number of 
years. It only lifted a ban on the import of Kenyan bull semen after Kenya lifted a ban 
on the import of Ugandan chicks into the Kenyan market.383  
Within the SADC region, since the establishment of Chirundu One Stop Border Post 
(OSBP) the average crossing time between Zambia and Zimbabwe is less than 30 
hours. This has considerably reduced the costs associated with clearing goods at the 
border, thus improving competitiveness.384 Viljoen cited in Amoako-Tuffour, Balchin, 
Calabrese and Mendez-Parra notes that ever since the introduction of Chirundu OSBP 
system, there has been reduction in the numbers of fraudulent activities committed by 
both importers and clearing agents.385  
Viljoen notes that the implementation of a simplified trade regime at the border post 
has significantly improved trading environment for small traders  with a number of 
these small traders benefiting from duty-free access on certain goods and gaining from 
being able to use simplified documents. This has led to higher levels of legal cross-
border trade and revenue generation, and lower transit times for small traders crossing 
the border on foot or by bus.386 
Similarly,in the East African Community (EAC) region, use of electronic platforms for 
customs procedures ensures there are proper recording data of trade movements and 
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revenue streams on an electronic system.387 The use of these electronic devices 
ensures faster and better record-keeping for both businesses and the government as 
they reduce cargo processing times, eliminate the possibility of errors and of corruption 
and guarantee better management of customs duties.388  
3.6                                                     Conclusion 
While African countries have made significant strides to improve trade through trade 
facilitation agreements, however these initiatives are yet to produce material benefits 
to the people of Africa. The challenge confronting African countries is the lack of 
implementation of these trade facilitation agreements and lack of human capacity to 
drive regional integration process.  
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                                                   CHAPTER 4 
             REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES (RECs) IN AFRICA 
4.1                                          INTRODUCTION  
Hartzenberg, Erasmus, and Kingombe observed that the economic integration model 
currently being pursued in Africa requires a specific institutional model that is governed 
by the rule of law.389 According to them, deeper integration demands extra legal 
arrangements and institutions to achieve uniformity in standards, comprehensible 
regulatory regimes,  legal remedies for private parties etc.390  
Certainly, the success of regional integration  depends on both strong institutional and 
legal frameworks. Such an arrangement will not only ensure that community laws 
enjoys supreme status but also that individuals and non-State entities play a 
meaningful role in the economic integration process. This arrangement would also 
allow private litigants to directly access dispute settlement bodies and would also 
ensure that a reputable judicial system is accessible to protect their rights and 
interests.  
4.2                            Status of Regional Law in Member States  
Salami observes that in contrast to EC provisions, most of the REC treaties neglect to 
provide for the status of REC legal instruments in Member States. For instance, Salami 
notes that the majority of REC treaties have a general provision on adherence to their 
treaty commitment and most REC treaties do not provide for the status of REC 
secondary law or legal instruments in Member States,  which is in contrast with EC 
treaties.391 These treaties do not mention any secondary law nor do they provide for 
the treatment of such law in Member States.392   
For Oppong, such provisions, which have neither a period for the legislation to be 
enacted nor a sanction for non-compliance are vulnerable to abuse and violations.393 
Oppong argues that REC member states have been bizarrely cautious about giving 
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force of law  to regional instruments in their national legal systems.394 According to 
Salami, it can be inferred from this ambiguity of most of the REC Treaty provisions 
that treaty drafters, as well as the ratifying states, had not prepared themselves for 
complying with the treaties.395 It is therefore not alarming that none of these RECs has 
failed to obtain or fully meet their stated objectives.396  
Salami observes that the RECs that provide for legal instruments to have binding effect 
but neglect to spell out the method of their implementation in Member States places 
the implementation of these instruments at the command of national parliaments to 
decide.397 The failure of most Member States to give a supreme status to REC 
provisions over national law suggests that these REC legal instruments would not be 
accepted in most Member Countries.398  
In respect to the SADC region, Bartels observes that the SADC norms that are not 
implemented give the impression that, within domestic legal systems, they are treated 
at best no different from domestic legislation, and at worst as a nullity.399 Bartels 
proposes that Article 6(5) be amended to state the superiority of SADC norms in 
relation to domestic norms in national legal systems.400 Bartels is of the view that  this 
needs to go further, and include a hierarchy over constitutional norms as well.401 
Bartels argues that the domestication of the principle of supremacy will ensure that 
national courts participate in the process of applying SADC law, by allowing them not 
to implement inconsistent national laws.402 
Oppong observes that there are provisions in the community treaties that may be 
construed as suggesting direct applicability of community law.403 For instance, article 
9(6) of the ECOWAS Treaty may be viewed as applicable directly.404 However, Salami 
notes that even in circumstances where the REC Treaty seems to provide for 
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supremacy of community law, the failure of Member States to give a supreme status 
to REC provisions makes the declaration on the supremacy of such legal instruments 
in the REC Treaty superfluous.405 According to Salami, the reason for this is that 
African states, irrespective of the types of legal system in place, generally continue to 
defy REC treaties and legal instruments.406  
Oppong argues that the dependence on national constitutional measures to give effect 
to community law is one of the main causes for the failure of Africa’s economic 
integration process since community laws are not immediately applicable at the 
national level.407 Oppong argues that though it is important that these founding treaties 
be scrutinised under national procedure, it makes no sense that previously accepted 
laws derived from legally constituted institutions under the treaty, using the correct 
legislative procedure, should not be instantly or directly applicable in the national legal 
system of countries that have already recognised such instruments as binding.408  
Fagbayibo argues that in order for laws emerging from transnational institutions to 
have power and be obeyed by the people, it is essential that they either possess equal 
legal status with national laws or in some cases have supreme status.409 For 
Fagbayibo, the issue is not the legal framework, whether monist or dualist, but rather 
the lack of political will from domestic level to implement transnational laws.410  
4.3                                  Status of individuals in regional courts 
Kiplagat notes that in the past, international law as well as national legal systems did 
not distinguish between the legal concepts of international personality and national 
sovereignty, distinct from international public law affairs that were resolved through 
diplomacy. Because of the development of private international law, particularly since 
international commercial transactions were increasingly conducted through non-state 
entities, a system to make provision for any disputes that may arise from international 
transactions had to be created, thus giving rise to the need to accommodate non-
governmental entities under private international law.411  
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According to Oppong, access and transparency are important to the legitimacy of 
international courts. Oppong submits that access to a court is dictated by its founding 
instrument, which would normally describe the types of persons who are allowed to 
litigate before the court and the causes of action they may bring to such courts.412 
These are then further developed through case law by the court. Oppong opines that 
it is encouraging to see that in all the regional courts except the SADC Tribunal, non 
state entities have a standing before these courts413 
Sang YK observes that the liberal provisions of locus standi and access to the sub-
regional trade judicial bodies in Africa are a new phenomenon and have only been 
used moderately of late.  Sang YK views these developments as rather strange, but 
nevertheless thought-provoking, as some of these sub-regional trade communities 
have been in existence for over three decades.414 An examination of the history of the 
different judicial bodies of sub-regional trade entities in Africa shows a slow 
institutional start-up. For example, the adoption of the Protocol establishing the SADC 
Tribunal and its applicable rules of procedure only took off in 2000 - ten years after the 
adoption of the constitutive treaty.415  
Likewise, Gathii submits that the growth of jurisdiction over human rights in a sub-
regional trade court in Africa is surprising, because national courts are under the 
authority or control of powerful officials.416 Consequently, the growing number of sub-
regional African courts that repeatedly hand out judgments that are against 
government is strange.417 Gathii attributes this to the increasing presence of strong 
civil society groups as well as the rise of a group of judges with a normative 
commitment to the rule of law, human rights, and good governance.418  
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However, Oppong cautions that a court not expressly empowered to adjudicate human 
rights claims must always be careful in assuming jurisdiction over such claims.419 He 
notes that these courts were established in the context of attempts to promote 
economic integration in their respective regions.420 According to Oppong, human rights 
litigation is also expected to cause displeasure between the courts and already 
established forums mandated to protect human rights, such as national courts, which 
should be working in hand-in-hand with the court in promoting economic integration.421  
For Oppong,   turning  these regional courts  into ‘human rights courts’ is pointless and 
should be discouraged.422 
Gathii observes that not all of Africa's international courts have reprocessed their 
commitments and their mandates for a new purpose  to include deciding human rights 
or environmental cases as those in East, West and Southern Africa have.423 For 
instance,  he notes that the COMESA Court of Justice has largely remained a labour 
tribunal.  Its case law has primarily developed from its employees and this court has 
not decided human rights cases.424 For Oppong, the constitutive treaties of the courts 
set several limitations on individual standing.425 The decision of SADC leaders that the 
jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal should be limited to disputes between member states 
further exacerbated this situation.426  
Oppong submits that notwithstanding these limitations, in general, the courts’ 
jurisprudence on standing reveals a progressive approach in respect of interpretation 
of the rules on standing. Oppong observes that the EACJ and ECOWAS Court have 
been open to public interest litigation, to ensure the observance of the treaties in the 
interest of community citizens.427  Furthermore, the EACJ and ECOWAS courts have 
held that a person who alleges a breach of the EAC Treaty and, in respect of 
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ECOWAS, a violation of human rights need not exhaust local remedies, or show a 
right or interest infringed, or damage suffered because of the alleged breach.428  
4.4            Enforcement and Recognition Of Judgments From Community Courts 
Oppong observes that in economic integration, the recognition and enforcement of 
state and community normative Acts facilitates their effective implementation and 
improves cross-border economic transactions.429 Therefore, a rule for the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign normative acts should be an integral part of a community’s 
legal framework on both community–national and regional level.430  
In terms of international law, a state may not rely on its national laws as a defence to 
a violation of an international obligation.431  Therefore, it is expected that when a 
member country’s national law violates a community law that Member State must bring 
that law into line with the community law and any failure to do so will result in the courts 
making adverse findings against the national government.432  
In the SADC region, tribunal ‘decisions’ on matters within its jurisdiction are final and 
binding.433 Therefore,  the SADC Tribunal is empowered to make decisions on any 
issue or violation under its jurisdiction.434 Bartels observes that under the long-
established principle of international law, tribunals have the power to order remedies 
even when this is not clearly expressed in their founding instruments.435 Moreover, 
both SADC provisions obligating member states to take all necessary steps to apply 
the tribunal decisions and the one that explicitly states that such decisions include 
those that are normally enforceable by individuals under national law.436 Clearly, the 
tribunal has the power to make any orders similar to those found in international 
tribunals.437  
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However, Saurombe observes that unlike the Eurpean Community (EC), currently 
there is no single African country that has guaranteed enforcement of legal decisions 
in its national systems.438 Saurombe observes that the  European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) has wide-ranging powers and may order a Member State found in breach of EC 
law to take action to remedy the breach and can issue heavy fines if a state fails to 
remedy such breach. If the defaulting party is one of the EU institutions, the 
Community institution concerned is called on to act and where the failure to act is held 
to be unlawful, it is for the institution in question to rectify the failure by appropriate 
measures.439  
As demonstrated, the question here is not so much about the powers of the Tribunal 
but is more about African countries’ willingness to guarantee and enforce community 
judgment. The SADC Tribunal is empowered to make any order that it deems 
necessary and this may include a demand for a defaulting  member state or SADC 
institution to comply with any law or rectify any failure to act. 
According to Afademeh-Adeyemi and Kalula,  lack of judgment enforcement 
mechanisms creates a lacuna in the enforcement of the Tribunal’s decision because 
it subjects the enforcement of Tribunal decisions to the domestic law that governs the 
enforcement of foreign judgments in member states.440 This was evident in the case 
of Gramara,441 in which the high court of Zimbabwe refused to register and enforce a 
judgment of the Tribunal on the grounds that the decision of the SADC Tribunal was 
against  public policy in Zimbabwe.442 
Oppong submits that using national courts to enforce international judgments is 
possibly the most potentially effective way of ensuring compliance with decisions of 
international courts and improving the effectiveness of international judgments.443 
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According to Oppong, national law supports international rule of law and strengthens 
the status of international law in national legal systems.444  
Nevertheless, Oppong admits that the use of national courts to enforce international 
judgements has its own challenges and many of these challenges have not been dealt 
with adequately.445 For Oppong, the conflicting judgments from Zimbabwean and 
South African courts in Mike Campbell and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe as well as 
the case of Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Louis Karel Fick demonstrate 
some of the challenges which individuals who obtain judgments from community 
courts can expect to face when they seek to enforce the judgment.446  
Afademeh-Adeyemi and Kalula opine that refusal to sanction tribunal decisions by the 
Zimbabwean government clearly show that member states can undermine regional 
intiatives or fail to honour their commitments under the relevant regional protocol. 
Afademeh-Adeyemi and Kalula argue that if regional integration is to be firmly rooted 
in SADC, the SADC Tribunal must be allowed to develop its own legal processes.447  
Saurombe submits that if SADC was employing the EU system, this possibly might 
have meant that Tribunal decisions are easily enforced by the Summit or any other 
Treaty- empowered organ which would have called upon Zimbabwe to set aside the 
land reform programme immediately.448 Failure to comply would have led to the 
imposition of economic sanctions.449 Bartels proposes that the SADC Tribunal 
Protocol be amended to state the types of orders that may be made by the SADC 
Tribunal.450 In addition, he urges for the amendment of the SADC Tribunal Protocol to 
empower the Tribunal to make orders for noncompliance with its decisions.451  
Indeed, it is necessary not only to amend the existing treaty relating to enforcement 
and recognition of judgments emanating from community courts but to state that 
community court judgments are binding on national courts subject to certain defined 
exceptions.  
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4.5        Enforcement and Recognition Of Civil Judgments From Other African 
Courts 
Tiba observes that national courts continue to be the most important forum for the 
resolution of cross border commercial disputes.452 National courts rely on rules of 
private international law to add3ress transnational and foreign elements of disputes 
before them.453 Private international law rules are the direct rules for solving cross-
border disputes including commercial disputes. Where there is nonexistence of 
international rules setting out common principles, there is bound to exist divergent 
positions among countries in any of these key areas of private international law.454   
Oppong notes that there is an emerging academic interest in private international law. 
He opines that as academic interest in private international law intensifies, the 
challenge for African scholars will be to produce a “genuinely African-based and 
African-influenced work on the conflict of laws.”455 According to Oppong, academic 
scholars will have to develop a unique model of private international law with specific 
rules that take into account Africa’s  realities.456  
Indeed, it is imperative that the convention embodying such a model considers the 
unique nature of African legal systems as practised by different African communities, 
before its regulatory framework is accepted as regional law. In other words, it is 
important that such convention not only make provisions for already well established 
businesses but also accommodate small business and informal businesses and 
traders.  
Bartels notes that in the SADC region, the legislation governing the recognition and 
enforcement of civil judgments in the common law SADC Member States only applies 
to foreign judgments from designated countries or, in one case, also decisions of 
designated ‘international tribunals’.457 None of the SADC Member States has 
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redesigned their national laws to ensure that such national recognition and 
enforcement legislation would apply to decisions of the SADC Tribunal.458  
The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is to some extent different for 
the civil law SADC Member States. In civil law countries, foreign judgments are 
enforceable by national courts.  It is likely also that decisions of the SADC Tribunal 
would, in principle, be enforceable as ‘foreign judgments’ on this basis.459  
Oppong argues that the cases in which judgments from African courts were refused 
registration in other national courts demonstrate a bigger problem, that is under the 
statutes on the registration of foreign judgments, few African countries have been 
designated as beneﬁciaries.460 For instance, the challenge of relying on national laws 
of recognition and enforcement of SADC tribunal decisions for their enforcement is 
found in the Gramara case, where the High Court of Zimbabwe considered the 
relevant Zimbabwe legislation on the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments to be inapplicable, firstly because the SADC Tribunal had not been 
designated under the legislation, and secondly because the decision was for 
declaratory and injunctive relief.461   
According to Oppong, after years of promoting economic integration this is disturbing 
as ‘it was expected that African governments, in their determination to promote unity, 
solidarity, cohesion, and cooperation among the peoples of Africa and African States, 
would make the procedure available to African judgments.’462 It is only between the 
founding members of the EAC that judgments can be registered in each other’s 
countries.463 
Oppong observes that in Africa, the common law rules for the enforcement of foreign 
judgments is flawed with technical and conceptual challenges.464 A civil suit to enforce 
a foreign judgment may take years. According to Oppong, this can hinder the free 
movement of persons, goods, capital, and services within the envisaged economic 
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community.465 The AEC Treaty does not contain express provisions that could be used 
as the basis for the establishment of an African negotiated international convention on 
the enforcement of foreign judgments.466 However, there are provisions in the EAC 
Treaty and ECOWAS respectively that could be applied as the legal basis for the 
establishment of a regional convention.467   
Therefore,  to address the divergent rules of recognition and enforcement,  each 
African state should designate many more African states as beneﬁciaries of its 
statutory regime for the registration of foreign judgments. Importantly, Africa must 
establish an African foreign judgment enforcement convention.468 This convention 
should aim at unifying and easing the procedures for enforcement, as well as limiting 
the grounds on which enforcement can be denied.469  
 
4.6                                 Different speeds and capabilities  
The AEC treaty aims to achieve the African Economic Community (AEC) by 2028 in 
six defined stages. However, the speed of implementation varies across the different 
communities. For example, the establishment of a free trade area and a customs union 
at the level of each REC is to be completed in 2017. While many RECs have managed 
to successfully launch their FTA and customs union, others are lagging. For instance, 
since January 2015, ECOWAS has made progress in shifting from a FTA to a customs 
union.470   
In contrast, ECCAS has fallen behind significantly for a number of reasons including 
succession of wars in the Great Lakes region, multiple memberships; etc.471 In 2004, 
ECCAS set up a free trade area with the hope of transforming it into a customs union 
by 2008. This, nevertheless, never materialised.  Implementation of the FTA in the 
ECCAS regions is still to secure broader support from all member states as hindrances 
still continue in some member states.472 In addition, EAC partner states have agreed 
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to remove Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) by December 2012, and without the presence of 
a legally binding framework and the necessary monitoring and implementation 
mechanisms, compliance among the member states varies across members 
depending on their political commitment.473 
Muthai observes that although the EAC has made remarkable progress since its 
formation, these gains have been unstable and disproportionate. Developments on 
the ground have not always reflected the rhetoric of the politicians and the obligations 
contained in the constitutive documents.474 The EAC is governed by princles of 
variable geometry and asymmetry.475 The provisions were included in the Treaty 
primarily to dispel the fears of Tanzania and Uganda, which feared that, because of 
their lower levels of development, their economies ran the risk of being flooded by 
Kenyan goods if they were obliged to liberalise at the same pace.476  
Hartzenberg, Erasmus, and Kingombe argue that the use of special and differential 
treatment and asymmetry provides some interim relief and is found in all the RECs. 
This allows Least Developed Country (LDC) member states to implement their 
obligations over longer periods and at a different pace.477 Eventually they must, 
however, comply with their scheduled tariff obligations in order to comply with the 
requirement to liberalise substantially all trade between the members.478 
The Common External Tariff (CET) and the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme 
(ETLS) comprise the most important parts of the customs union and form an important 
first step towards the creation of a common market.479 At present, eight signatories to 
ECOWAS have implemented the CET. Combining the customs union by ensuring 
member countries fully implement the provisions of the CET remains a challenge that 
needs to be resolved in order for ECOWAS to establish the next stage of a common 
market.  Four decades on, ECOWAS is only in the early days of its customs union.480 
                                                          
473  Cited in Trudi Hartzenberg, Gerhard Erasmus, and Christian K.M. Kingombe at 18. 
474  Henry Kibet Mutai op cit note 34 at 82. 
475  Ibid at 83. 
476  Ibid. 
477  Cited in Trudi Hartzenberg, Gerhard Erasmus, and Christian K.M. Kingombe at 1. 
478  Ibid. 
479  Cited Amoako-Tuffour, Balchin, Calabrese and Mendez-Parra at 14. 
480  Ibid. 
72 
 
The lack of progress is not for the lack of policies, but is owing to the lack of 
implementation of agreed policies at the national level.481  
In addition, the common market protocol was operational in July 2010. It was 
supposed to be fully implemented by December 2015. Seemingly, Rwanda is the only 
country to have complied so far with agreed deadlines, which seems to meet with the 
broader developmental policies and implementation arrangements that the leaders in 
Rwanda have adopted.482 
  4.7                                         Conclusion  
This chapter has highlighted not only the disparities within the laws governing rules of 
recognition and enforcement of regional and national court judgment in Africa in the 
context of African regional integration but also demonstrated that African countries are 
at different speeds and level of development hence the varying degrees of 
implementation. 
There are divergent rules of recognition and enforcement in regional and national  
court judgment in Africa and national courts continue to be the most important forum 
for resolution of cross border commercial disputes. This chapter observed that there 
is generally inactivity of individuals and non-state entities in the development of rules 
of recognition and enforcement in disputes with international elements.  
In addition, this part of this research also observed lack of legally binding instruments 
and the necessary monitoring and implementation mechanisms, political turmoil and 
economic factors have further contributed to this situation. The following chapter 
concludes by summarising the entire research and provide recommendations not only 
to policy directors but those who seek to do further research on this area of law.  
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                                                      Chapter 5  
 5.                                     Conclusion and Recommendations 
                                                               Introduction 
This research has shown that while Africa has made significant strides to achieve its 
stated objectives and has improved its economic growth and trade, it has been unable 
to translate these developments to demonstrable socio-economic benefits, especially 
dealing with the rising poverty and inequality levels in Africa. In addition, the economic 
integration model suffers from several challenges and has not achieved its goals, 
because of among other things, weak legal and institutional frameworks, and lack of 
support from ordinary African citizens and the private sector. Nevertheless, the 
economic model of integration remains the driving force of African regional integration.  
This was interrogated in terms of its appropriateness and suitability for Africa under its 
existing arrangements.  
The study concluded that despite African countries embracing the economic model of 
integration and despite the policy drive to facilitate trade and investment, African 
regional integration is unlikely to succeed with this model because it does not consider 
African realities and lacks the necessary prerequisites for successful economic 
integration.  
To support this view, the research employed a significant number of scholarly 
discussions, first-hand studies, and case law to illustrate the existing gaps in African 
regional integration. This study found that there are not only foundational, definitional, 
institutional, and legal gaps within the African regional integration structure but that 
there are also existing disparities between African realities and regional policies. 
Nevertheless, this study demonstrated that with the right model, Africa has the 
potential to successfully realise its integration aspirations, and has considerably 
improved its trade and demonstrated a strong policy framework and has taken 
important steps to improve trade. To address these challenges and improve African 
regional integration, the research recommends the following: 
5.1                        Develop a new economic model of integration   
African regional integration studies have been dominated by the economists who are 
concerned with economic outcomes. Thus, economic understanding of integration 
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understates the interplay between law, politics and most importantly in the African 
context, socio-economic issues. It is important that Africa reconsiders the narrow 
economic understanding of integration and broadens it to include not only other 
disciplines but also to place prominence on socio-economic issues and the role of law 
in addressing issues such as poverty and inequality.  
Africa must develop a new economic model that highlight Africa’s socio-economic and 
political challenges. This should then be accompanied by the active involvement of 
both private sector and ordinary people in shaping its direction.  
5.2           Transform the existing institutions and law to reflect African realities 
African governments must transform the existing institutions and laws to reflect African 
realities. While it is important to acknowledge and appreciate the minimum role that 
has been played by these institutions mandated to drive regional integration, they have 
been unable to promote African regional integration. It remains doubtful whether the 
AU under the current institutional framework is capable of successfully promoting 
regional integration and addressing the 21st century challenges affecting the African 
continent since these challenges continue to torment the continent. Without a doubt, 
the success of regional integration  depends on both strong institutional and legal 
frameworks that are governed by the rule of law.  
5.3                              Implement regional agreements  
The issue confronting Africa’s integration process is that regional policies remain 
unimplemented or suffer from poor implementation. Under such circumstances, it is 
difficult for Africa to achieve its stated integration goals. Consequently, policies that 
are designed to address these challenges remain unimplemented and where they are 
put into operation, member countries depart and sidetrack from their intended 
purpose.  This thwarts the regional integration process and makes it difficult to proceed 
to the next level of integration. 
5.4             Establish an African Convention for Recognition and Enforcement  
It would be useful to establish an African convention to deal with the diverging rules of 
enforcement and recognition in view of the different African legal systems as practised 
by different African countries and economic communities, before such convention is 
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accepted as regional law. This convention must state clealy the supremacy of 
community courts subject to certain defined exceptions.  
A detailed research should be conducted to determine whether or not it would be 
beneficial for Africa to develop its own model of rules regulating the recognition and 
enforcement of judgement by way of a single convention distinct from the laws created 
and designed by their colonial powers. 
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